Endogenous Entry, Banking, and Business Cycle

We consider a DSGE model with flexible prices, monopolistic competitive banks and sticky interest rates, together with endogenous firms exit and entry decisions. We find that economies characterized by endogenous firms dynamics imply higher volatilities of both real and financial variables than those implied by a DSGE with monopolistic banking and a fixed number of firms, in response to both real and financial shocks. The model with endogenous exit, in line with the empirical evidence, implies: i) countercyclical exit; ii) an endogenous countercyclical bank markup and an endogenous countercyclical interest rate spread; iii) a quicker recovery in the aftermath of a financial crisis, when the macroprudential authority implements countercyclical capital requirements (Basel III). This policy is more stabilizing than Basel II as well as than an alternative Taylor rule explicitly targeting capital-to-asset ratio.