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Inferior Factor in Cournot Oligopoly Revisited

Author

Listed:
  • Paolo Bertoletti

    (Department of Economics and Management, University of Pavia)

  • Pierre Von Mouche

    (Economics of Consumers and Households, Wageningen University)

Abstract

We reconsider the recent work by [Oku10] on (possibly asymmetric) Cournotian firms with two production factors, one of them being inferior. It is shown there that an increase in the price of the inferior factor does raise equilibrium industry output. In addition of providing a simpler and more rigorous proof of such a result, we generalize it to the case of technologies with s = 2 factors and allow some firms not to use the inferior one.

Suggested Citation

  • Paolo Bertoletti & Pierre Von Mouche, 2012. "Inferior Factor in Cournot Oligopoly Revisited," DEM Working Papers Series 005, University of Pavia, Department of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:pav:demwpp:demwp0005
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. William Novshek, 1985. "On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(1), pages 85-98.
    2. Leon A Petrosyan & Nikolay A Zenkevich, 2016. "Game Theory," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number 9824, August.
    3. Koji Okuguchi, 2010. "Inferior factor in Cournot oligopoly," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 101(2), pages 125-131, October.
    4. Paolo Bertoletti & Giorgio Rampa, 2013. "On inferior inputs and marginal returns," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 109(3), pages 303-313, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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