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Networks and Anti-Poverty Programs: The NREG Experience

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  • Shylashri Shankar
  • Raghav Gaiha

Abstract

Governments struggle with the reality that the beneficiaries of anti-poverty programs are powerless to influence policies and stem the possibility of capture of benefits by the nonpoor. Networks – social and political – are supposed to increase the ability of the lesspowerful to access their entitlements. The paper assesses whether socially and politically networked households do in fact have better awareness of the components of the program and of the processes of decision making, and whether such networking makes them more likely to vocalize their dissatisfaction when their entitlements are threatened. India's national rural employment guarantee scheme's (NREG) institutional design (mandating village assemblies to authorize decisions on the projects) makes it a good test case. Our results show that links to social and political networks do significantly increase the awareness of the villagers on the program's components and enhances their ability to seek redress of their grievances.

Suggested Citation

  • Shylashri Shankar & Raghav Gaiha, 2011. "Networks and Anti-Poverty Programs: The NREG Experience," ASARC Working Papers 2011-05, The Australian National University, Australia South Asia Research Centre.
  • Handle: RePEc:pas:asarcc:2011-05
    as

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    File URL: https://crawford.anu.edu.au/acde/asarc/pdf/papers/2011/WP2011_05.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Networks; anti-poverty programs; NREG; India;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
    • C81 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data; Data Access
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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