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From people's preferences to political representation. The case of the Spanish regional elections

Author

Listed:
  • Pedro Albarrán

    (University o Alicante)

  • Carmen Herrero

    (University o Alicante & Ivie)

  • Antonio Villar

    (Universidad Pablo de Olavide & ISEAK)

Abstract

In this paper, we conduct an empirical analysis of the transition from voters' preferences to electoral outcomes, a process significantly influenced by the electoral system. We introduce a measure called 'support' that summarizes voters’ preferences. Then, we examine how these preferences are compressed under the plurality voting mechanism, which forces to select just one option. This choice is captured by the 'affinity', which singles out the preferred party for each voter. The final decision, though, is affected by strategic considerations and several other factors. Using survey data from three Spanish regions (Andalusia, Madrid, and the Valencian Community) prior to their respective Regional Elections, our findings indicate that political representation in all three Regional Parliaments would be more diverse if based on voters’ complete preferences (i.e., support). In all instances, smaller parties lose ground, a trend that emerges even before strategic considerations. These results suggest that the electoral system may exacerbate political polarization, diverging from social preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Pedro Albarrán & Carmen Herrero & Antonio Villar, 2024. "From people's preferences to political representation. The case of the Spanish regional elections," Working Papers 24.02, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:pab:wpaper:24.02
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Antonio Villar, 2023. "The precedence function: a numerical evaluation method for multicriteria ranking problems," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(2), pages 211-219, October.
    2. Antonio Villar, 2023. "Correction: The precedence function: a numerical evaluation method for multicriteria ranking problems," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(2), pages 221-221, October.
    3. Herrero, Carmen & Villar, Antonio, 2021. "Group decisions from individual rankings: The Borda–Condorcet rule," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 291(2), pages 757-765.
    4. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 2008. "On The Robustness of Majority Rule," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 949-973, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voting; regional elections; surveys; voters’ preferences; political support; political representation; Spain.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N36 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy - - - Latin America; Caribbean
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers

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