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Dependence and Uniqueness in Bayesian Games

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  • Alan Beggs

Abstract

This paper studies uniqueness of equilibrium in symmetric 2 x 2 bayesian games. It shows that if signals are highly but not perfectly dependent then players play their risk-dominant actions for all but a vanishing set of signal realizations. In contrast to the global games literature, noise is not assumed to be additive. Dependence is modeled using the theory of copulas.

Suggested Citation

  • Alan Beggs, 2012. "Dependence and Uniqueness in Bayesian Games," Economics Series Working Papers 603, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:603
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Frankel, David M. & Morris, Stephen & Pauzner, Ady, 2003. "Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 1-44, January.
    2. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September.
    3. Mathevet, Laurent, 2014. "Beliefs and rationalizability in games with complementarities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 252-271.
    4. Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 2, number 9780123745071.
    5. Van Zandt, Timothy & Vives, Xavier, 2007. "Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 339-360, May.
    6. Laurent Mathevet, 2010. "A contraction principle for finite global games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 42(3), pages 539-563, March.
    7. Athey, Susan, 2001. "Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 861-889, July.
    8. Müller, Alfred & Scarsini, Marco, 2005. "Archimedean copulæ and positive dependence," Journal of Multivariate Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 434-445, April.
    9. Nelsen, Roger B. & Quesada-Molina, José Juan & Rodri­guez-Lallena, José Antonio & Úbeda-Flores, Manuel, 2008. "On the construction of copulas and quasi-copulas with given diagonal sections," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 473-483, April.
    10. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bayesian games; Global games; Uniqueness; Copulas; Risk dominance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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