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Re-Thinking Reputation

Author

Listed:
  • Andrew Mell

Abstract

Economic models of reputation make strong assumptions about the information available to players. In particular, it is assumed that they know the entire history of the game to date. Such models can seldom reproduce the cycling of reputations we observe in the real world. We build a model of reputation with more realistic assumptions about the partial knowledge of the history that would be available and how it might be used. This new approach can explain cycles in reputations.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew Mell, 2011. "Re-Thinking Reputation," Economics Series Working Papers 565, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:565
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 407-432, March.
    2. Liu, Qingmin & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2009. "Limited Records and Reputation," Research Papers 2030, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    3. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2001. "Who Wants a Good Reputation?," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(2), pages 415-441.
    4. Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2011. "Sustainable reputations with rating systems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 479-503, March.
    5. Bar-Isaac, Heski & Tadelis, Steven, 2008. "Seller Reputation," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 4(4), pages 273-351, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Reputation; monitoring; expectations formation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations

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