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General Equilibrium Model for an Asymmetric Information Economy without Delivery Upper Bounds

Author

Listed:
  • Ken Urai

    (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University)

  • Akihiko Yoshimachi

    (Doshisha University)

  • Kohei Shiozawa

    (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University)

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce production into the standard general equilibrium model with asym- metric information, which was proposed by Dubey et al. (Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 2000; Econometrica 2005). In such an economy, there is no rational explanation for producers' de- livery upper bounds while the endowments naturally limit consumers' deliveries. However, we show that the typical equilibrium allocation of the asymmetric information economy necessarily and sub- stantially depends on such exogenous upper bounds (Example 1 and Theorem 1). In other words, an equilibrium existence theorem without such upper bounds, even if such exists, will typically fail to treat the asymmetric information problem, e.g., the adverse selection problem. Hence, to treat the equilibrium existence problem under the informational asymmetry appropriately, we have to extend the standard model so that the delivery upper bounds need not to be speci ed explicitly. For this purpose, we propose a quite natural and realistic assumption with respect to the techno- logical condition related to the market delivery, i.e., the existence of some small standardization, commoditization, and/or transaction costs of market deliveries is shown to be sufficient (Theorem 3).

Suggested Citation

  • Ken Urai & Akihiko Yoshimachi & Kohei Shiozawa, 2013. "General Equilibrium Model for an Asymmetric Information Economy without Delivery Upper Bounds," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 13-27-Rev.2, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics, revised Mar 2017.
  • Handle: RePEc:osk:wpaper:1327r2
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Correia-da-Silva, João, 2012. "General equilibrium in markets for lemons," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 187-195.
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    3. Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos & Martin Shubik, 2005. "Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(1), pages 1-37, January.
    4. Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos & Martin Shubik, 2000. "Default in a General Equilibrium Model with Incomplete Markets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1247, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    5. Martin Meier & Enrico Minelli & Herakles Polemarchakis, 2014. "Competitive markets with private information on both sides," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(2), pages 257-280, February.
    6. Bisin, Alberto & Gottardi, Piero, 1999. "Competitive Equilibria with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 1-48, July.
    7. Bisin, A. & Gottardi, P., 1999. "Competitive Equilibria with Asymmetric Information: Existence with Entry Fees," Working Papers 99-03, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    8. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    general equilibrium model; asymmetric information; adverse selection; market viability problem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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