General Equilibrium Model for an Asymmetric Information Economy without Delivery Upper Bounds
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More about this item
Keywords
general equilibrium model; asymmetric information; adverse selection; market viability problem;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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