IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/osf/osfxxx/x82yh.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Crime and Punishment: Adam Smith’s Theory of Sentimental Law and Economics

Author

Listed:
  • Paganelli, Maria Pia
  • Simon, Fabrizio
  • Assistant, JHET

Abstract

For Adam Smith a crime is not the result of a rational calculation of loss and gain, but the consequence of envy and a vain desire to parade wealth to attract the approbation of others, combined with a natural systematic bias in overestimating the probability of success. Similarly, Smith does not conceive of legal sanctions as a rational deterrent, but as deriving from the feeling of resentment. While the prevailing approach of the eighteenth century is a rational explanation of crime and a utilitarian use of punishment, Adam Smith instead builds his theory of criminal behavior and legal prosecution consistently on the sentiments. A well-functioning legal system is thus an unintended consequence of our desire to bring justice to the individual person, not the result of a rational calculation to promote the public good, just like a well-functioning economic system is the unintended consequence of our desire to better our own condition, not the result of a rational calculation to promote public good.

Suggested Citation

  • Paganelli, Maria Pia & Simon, Fabrizio & Assistant, JHET, 2020. "Crime and Punishment: Adam Smith’s Theory of Sentimental Law and Economics," OSF Preprints x82yh, Center for Open Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:osf:osfxxx:x82yh
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/x82yh
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://osf.io/download/5f73487046080903f31b6bee/
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.31219/osf.io/x82yh?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Amos Witztum & Jeffrey T. Young, 2013. "Utilitarianism and the role of utility in Adam Smith," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(4), pages 572-602, August.
    3. Maria Pia Paganelli, 2008. "The Adam Smith Problem in Reverse: Self-Interest in The Wealth of Nations and The Theory of Moral Sentiments," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 40(2), pages 365-382, Summer.
    4. Craig Smith, 2013. "Adam Smith: Left or Right?," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 61(4), pages 784-798, December.
    5. Redman, Deborah A, 1993. "Adam Smith and Isaac Newton," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 40(2), pages 210-230, May.
    6. Warren J. Samuels & Steven G. Medema, 2005. "Freeing Smith from the “Free Market”: On the Misperception of Adam Smith on the Economic Role of Government," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 37(2), pages 219-226, Summer.
    7. Fiori, Stefano, 2012. "Adam Smith On Method: Newtonianism, History, Institutions, And The “Invisible Hand”," Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Cambridge University Press, vol. 34(3), pages 411-435, September.
    8. Mizuta, Hiroshi, 2000. "Adam Smith's Library: A Catalogue," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198285908.
    9. Smith, Adam, 1776. "An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, number smith1776.
    10. Samuel Hollander, 2016. "Ethical Utilitarianism and The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Adam Smith in Relation to Hume and Bentham," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 42(4), pages 557-580, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Michael Munger, 2020. "Moral community and moral order: Buchanan’s theory of obligation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(3), pages 509-521, June.
    2. Betsy Jane Clary, 2009. "Smith and Living Wages: Arguments in Support of a Mandated Living Wage," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(5), pages 1063-1084, November.
    3. Glötzl, Erhard, 2015. "Why and How to overcome General Equilibrium Theory," MPRA Paper 66265, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Vriend, Nicolaas J., 1996. "Rational behavior and economic theory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 263-285, March.
    5. Panayiotis Agisilaou, 2013. "Collusion in Industrial Economics and Optimally Designed Leniency Programmes - A Survey," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2013-03, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    6. Roni Hirsch, 2021. "Risk and Trouble: Adam Smith on Profit and the Protagonists of Capitalism," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(1), pages 166-179, January.
    7. Robert B. Ekelund Jr & Edward O. Price III, 2012. "The Economics of Edwin Chadwick," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14915.
    8. van Ours, Jan C. & Williams, Jenny & Ward, Shannon, 2015. "Bad Behavior: Delinquency, Arrest and Early School Leaving," CEPR Discussion Papers 10755, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Khalil, Umair, 2017. "Do more guns lead to more crime? Understanding the role of illegal firearms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 342-361.
    10. Charles M. A. Clark, 2021. "Editor’s Introduction: Economics and the Option for the Poor," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 80(4), pages 1051-1059, September.
    11. Patrick Arni & Rafael Lalive & Jan C. Van Ours, 2013. "How Effective Are Unemployment Benefit Sanctions? Looking Beyond Unemployment Exit," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(7), pages 1153-1178, November.
    12. Dennis L. Gärtner, 2022. "Corporate Leniency in a Dynamic World: The Preemptive Push of an Uncertain Future," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(1), pages 119-146, March.
    13. Deborah A. Cobb-Clark & Chris Ryan & Ana Sartbayeva, 2009. "Taking Chances: The Effect of Growing Up on Welfare on the Risky Behaviour of Young People," CEPR Discussion Papers 604, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.
    14. Antonio Acconcia & Marcello D'Amato & Riccardo Martina, 2003. "Corruption and Tax Evasion with Competitive Bribes," CSEF Working Papers 112, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    15. J. K. Pappalardo, 2022. "Economics of Consumer Protection: Contributions and Challenges in Estimating Consumer Injury and Evaluating Consumer Protection Policy," Journal of Consumer Policy, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 201-238, June.
    16. M. Martin Boyer, 2007. "Resistance (to Fraud) Is Futile," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 74(2), pages 461-492, June.
    17. David Cayla, 2021. "Le « vivre-ensemble » face au projet néolibéral," Post-Print hal-02961194, HAL.
    18. Gary Bolton & Eugen Dimant & Ulrich Schmidt, 2018. "When a Nudge Backfires. Using Observation with Social and Economic Incentives to Promote Pro-Social Behavior," PPE Working Papers 0017, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    19. Dwenger, Nadja & Kleven, Henrik & Rasul, Imran & Rincke, Johannes, 2014. "Extrinsic vs Intrinsic Motivations for Tax Compliance. Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment in Germany," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100389, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    20. Daron Acemoglu & Matthew O. Jackson, 2017. "Social Norms and the Enforcement of Laws," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 245-295.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:osf:osfxxx:x82yh. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: OSF (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://osf.io/preprints/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.