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Design Choices in Central Clearing: Issues Facing Small Advanced Economies

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ntral clearing of derivatives contracts is one way to reduce risk in the financial system. Since the crisis of 2008/09 there has been an international push to clear more derivatives contracts through central counterparties. This paper reviews some of the considerations facing small advanced economies, such as New Zealand.

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  • Edwin Budding & David Murphy, 2014. "Design Choices in Central Clearing: Issues Facing Small Advanced Economies," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Analytical Notes series AN2014/08, Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
    • Handle: RePEc:nzb:nzbans:2014/08
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    File URL: http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/-/media/ReserveBank/Files/Publications/Analytical%20notes/2014/an2014-08.pdf
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    1. Murphy, David & Vasios, Michalis & Vause, Nick, 2014. "Financial Stability Paper No 29: An investigation into the procyclicality of risk-based initial margin models," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 29, Bank of England.
    2. Darrell Duffie & Haoxiang Zhu, 2011. "Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce Counterparty Risk?," The Review of Asset Pricing Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 74-95.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jorge Cruz Lopez & Mark Manning, 2017. "Who Pays? CCP Resource Provision in the Post-Pittsburgh World," Discussion Papers 17-17, Bank of Canada.

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