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Central Bank Communication: Never Excuse, Never Explain

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  • Stephen Millard

Abstract

For most of the 20th century and earlier, central banks went about their business without ever feeling the need to communicate what they were doing to the financial markets or the general public. Then from around 1990 onwards, central banks became ever more transparent, trying to make clear to the markets and the public what they were doing and why. This policy paper explores why this change came about and how successful it has been.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen Millard, 2022. "Central Bank Communication: Never Excuse, Never Explain," National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) Policy Papers 33, National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:nsr:niesrp:33
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jeffrey R. Campbell & Charles L. Evans & Jonas D.M. Fisher & Alejandro Justiniano, 2012. "Macroeconomic Effects of Federal Reserve Forward Guidance," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 43(1 (Spring), pages 1-80.
    2. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Michael Woodford, 2003. "The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 34(1), pages 139-235.
    3. Ana Lasaosa, 2007. "Learning the Rules of the New Game? Comparing the Reactions in Financial Markets to Announcements before and after the Bank of England's Operational Independence," Ekonomia, Cyprus Economic Society and University of Cyprus, vol. 10(1), pages 18-41, Summer.
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