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'Arranged' Marriage, Co-Residence and Female Schooling: a Model with Evidence from India

Author

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  • Indraneel Dasgupta,
  • Pushkar Maitra,
  • Diganta Mukherjee

Abstract

We model the consequences of parental control over choice of wives for sons, for parental incentives to educate daughters, when the marriage market exhibits competitive dowry payments and altruistic but paternalistic parents benefit from having married sons live with them. By choosing uneducated brides, some parents can prevent costly household partition. Paternalistic self-interest consequently generates low levels of female schooling in the steady state equilibrium. State payments to parents for educating daughters fail toraise female schooling levels. Policies (such as housing subsidies) that promote nuclear families, interventions against early marriages, and state support to couples who marry against parental wishes, are however all likely to improve female schooling. We offer evidence from India consistent with our theoretical analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Indraneel Dasgupta, & Pushkar Maitra, & Diganta Mukherjee, 2006. "'Arranged' Marriage, Co-Residence and Female Schooling: a Model with Evidence from India," Discussion Papers 06/03, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.
    • Handle: RePEc:not:notcre:06/03
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Junsen Zhang & William Chan, 1999. "Dowry and Wife's Welfare: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(4), pages 786-808, August.
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    6. Anderson, Siwan, 2007. "Why the marriage squeeze cannot cause dowry inflation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 140-152, November.
    7. Siwan Anderson, 2003. "Why Dowry Payments Declined with Modernization in Europe but Are Rising in India," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(2), pages 269-310, April.
    8. Lena Edlund, 2000. "The Marriage Squeeze Interpretation of Dowry Inflation: A Comment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(6), pages 1327-1333, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Soumyanetra Munshi, 2014. "'Arranged' Marriage, Education, and Dowry: A Contract-Theoretic Perspective," Working Papers id:5696, eSocialSciences.
    2. Lídia Farré, 2013. "The Role of Men in the Economic and Social Development of Women: Implications for Gender Equality," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 28(1), pages 22-51, February.
    3. M. Shahe Emran & Fenohasina Maret-Rakotondrazaka & Stephen C. Smith, 2014. "Education and Freedom of Choice: Evidence from Arranged Marriages in Vietnam," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(4), pages 481-501, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Arranged marriage; Dowry; Bride price; Female literacy; Marriage markets; Stable marriage allocation.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination

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