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Strategic Behavior and Marriage Payments: Theory and Evidence from Senegal

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  • Frederic Gaspart
  • Jean-Philippe Platteau

Abstract

This article proposes an original theory of marriage payments based on insights gained from firsthand information collected in the Senegal River valley. This theory postulates that decisions about the bride-price, which are made by the bride's father, take into account the likely effects of the amount set on the risk of ill-treatment of the wife and the risk of marriage failure. Based on a sequential game with three players (the bride's father, the husband, and the wife) and a matching process, it leads to a number of important predictions that are tested against Senegalese data relating to bride-prices and various characteristics of women. The empirical results confirm that parents behave strategically by keeping bride-prices down so as to reduce the risk of marriage failure for their daughters. Other interesting effects on marriage payments and the probability of separation are also highlighted, stressing the role of the bride's bargaining power in her own family. (c) 2010 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.

Suggested Citation

  • Frederic Gaspart & Jean-Philippe Platteau, 2010. "Strategic Behavior and Marriage Payments: Theory and Evidence from Senegal," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(1), pages 149-185, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:ecdecc:v:59:y:2010:i:1:p:149-185
    DOI: 10.1086/655457
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fafchamps, Marcel & Quisumbing, Agnes, 2005. "Assets at marriage in rural Ethiopia," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 1-25, June.
    2. Francis Bloch & Vijayendra Rao, 2002. "Terror as a Bargaining Instrument: A Case Study of Dowry Violence in Rural India," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1029-1043, September.
    3. Becker, Gary S, 1974. "A Theory of Marriage: Part II," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(2), pages 11-26, Part II, .
    4. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "A Theory of Marriage," NBER Chapters, in: Economics of the Family: Marriage, Children, and Human Capital, pages 299-351, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Grossbard, Amyra, 1978. "Towards a Marriage between Economics and Anthropology and a General Theory of Marriage," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 33-37, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alessandra Voena & Lucia Corno, 2015. "Selling daughters: age at marriage, income shocks and bride price tradition," 2015 Meeting Papers 1089, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    2. Hotte, Rozenn & Lambert, Sylvie, 2023. "Marriage payments and wives’ welfare: All you need is love," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 164(C).
    3. Nava Ashraf & Natalie Bau & Nathan Nunn & Alessandra Voena, 2020. "Bride Price and Female Education," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(2), pages 591-641.
    4. Guirkinger, Catherine & Gross, Jérémie & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2021. "Are women emancipating? Evidence from marriage, divorce and remarriage in Rural Northern Burkina Faso☆," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    5. Deschênes, Sarah & Dumas, Christelle & Lambert, Sylvie, 2020. "Household resources and individual strategies," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
    6. Ahmed Elsayed & Olivier Marie, 2020. "Less School (Costs), More (Female) Education? Lessons from Egypt Reducing Years of Compulsory Schooling," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 20-037/V, Tinbergen Institute.
    7. Linguère Mously Mbaye & Natascha Wagner, 2017. "Bride Price and Fertility Decisions: Evidence from Rural Senegal," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 53(6), pages 891-910, June.
    8. Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Gaspart, Frederic, 2007. "The Perverse Effects of High Brideprices," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 35(7), pages 1221-1236, July.
    9. Jean-Marie Baland & Roberta Ziparo, 2017. "Intra-household bargaining in poor countries," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2017-108, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    10. Indraneel Dasgupta, & Pushkar Maitra, & Diganta Mukherjee, 2006. "'Arranged' Marriage, Co-Residence and Female Schooling: a Model with Evidence from India," Discussion Papers 06/03, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.
    11. Aldashev, Gani & Chaara, Imane & Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Wahhaj, Zaki, 2012. "Using the law to change the custom," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 182-200.
    12. Khan, Sarah, 2024. "Female education and marriage in Pakistan: The role of financial shocks and marital customs," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 173(C).
    13. Laszlo, Sonia & Grantham, Kate & Oskay, Ecem & Zhang, Tingting, 2020. "Grappling with the challenges of measuring women's economic empowerment in intrahousehold settings," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
    14. Jean-Marie Baland & Roberta Ziparo, 2017. "Intra-household bargaining in poor countries," WIDER Working Paper Series 108, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).

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