Price Manipulation in Peer-to-Peer Markets and the Sharing Economy
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- Shunyuan Zhang & Nitin Mehta & Param Vir Singh & Kannan Srinivasan, 2021. "Frontiers: Can an Artificial Intelligence Algorithm Mitigate Racial Economic Inequality? An Analysis in the Context of Airbnb," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 40(5), pages 813-820, September.
- Schlütter, Frank, 2022. "Managing Seller Conduct in Online Marketplaces and Platform Most-Favored Nation Clauses," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2022026, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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More about this item
Keywords
two-sided markets; peer-to-peer platforms; sharing economy; price recommendations; cheap talk;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L16 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics; Macroeconomic Industrial Structure
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- M31 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Marketing
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2019-10-14 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-GTH-2019-10-14 (Game Theory)
- NEP-PAY-2019-10-14 (Payment Systems and Financial Technology)
- NEP-REG-2019-10-14 (Regulation)
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