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Platform Competition: The Role of Multi-homing and Complementors

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  • Juan D. Carrillo

    (University of Southern California)

  • Guofu Tan

    (University of Southern California)

Abstract

In this paper we present a model of platform competition in which two firms offer horizontally differentiated platforms and a group of complementors offers products that are complementary to each platform. Consumers can buy either or both platforms (single- or multihoming) and complementors can produce for either or both platforms (single- or multi-production). We first characterize the pricing structure and find that, in equilibrium, consumers are more likely to multihome as the differentiation of platforms decreases or as the number of complementors for either platform increases. We show that the platform and its complementors always benefit from an increase in the number of complementors in their own platform. When single-homing arises in equilibrium, the platform and its complementors suffer from an increase in the number of complementors in the rival platform. We also study the incentives of the platform to integrate with its complementors, to charge them a royalty or give a subsidy, and to sell its own complementary products to the rival platform.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan D. Carrillo & Guofu Tan, 2006. "Platform Competition: The Role of Multi-homing and Complementors," Working Papers 06-30, NET Institute, revised Oct 2006.
    • Handle: RePEc:net:wpaper:0630
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nicholas Economides & Evangelos Katsamakas, 2006. "Two-Sided Competition of Proprietary vs. Open Source Technology Platforms and the Implications for the Software Industry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(7), pages 1057-1071, July.
    2. Mark Armstrong, 2006. "Competition in two‐sided markets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 668-691, September.
    3. Economides, Nicholas & Salop, Steven C, 1992. "Competition and Integration among Complements, and Network Market Structure," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(1), pages 105-123, March.
    4. Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, Bruno, 2003. "Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 309-328, Summer.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ramon Casadesus-Masanell & Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda, 2008. "Platform Competition, Compatibility, and Social Efficiency," Working Papers 08-32, NET Institute.
    2. Jay Pil Choi, 2010. "Tying In Two‐Sided Markets With Multi‐Homing," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(3), pages 607-626, September.
    3. Van Cayseele Patrick & Reynaerts Jo, 2011. "Complementary Platforms," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-33, March.
    4. Yong Chao & Timothy Derdenger, 2013. "Mixed Bundling in Two-Sided Markets in the Presence of Installed Base Effects," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(8), pages 1904-1926, August.
    5. Carrillo, Juan D. & Tan, Guofu, 2021. "Platform competition with complementary products," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    6. Garcia Pires Armando J., 2020. "Content Provision in the Media Market with Single-Homing and Multi-Homing Consumers," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 19(1), pages 43-83, March.
    7. Rong, Ke & Xiao, Fei & Zhang, Xiaoyu & Wang, Jingjing, 2019. "Platform strategies and user stickiness in the online video industry," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 249-259.
    8. Quint, Daniel, 2014. "Imperfect competition with complements and substitutes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 266-290.

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    Keywords

    Platform competition; multi-homing; complementor; royalty and subsidy;
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