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Strategic Trading in a Two-Sided Foreign Exchange Auction

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  • Linda Goldberg
  • Rafael Tenorio

Abstract

The market microstructure chosen for foreign exchange markets can influence trading volumes and equilibrium exchange rates. With emerging markets and developing countries increasingly utilizing two- sided auctions, we show that the choice of the discrete 'tƒtonnement' auction creates incentives for strategic behavior among market participants. We provide theoretical predictions on strategic under- revelation of demand or supply positions that are supported empirically using detailed data from a rare example of a tƒtonnement market, the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange. Our results also are consistent with findings from experimental work on auctions: new entrants altered strategic behavior mainly on the market's demand side, without comparable implications for the supply side. We also show that bids and offers were influenced by fundamentals and specific policy measures.

Suggested Citation

  • Linda Goldberg & Rafael Tenorio, 1995. "Strategic Trading in a Two-Sided Foreign Exchange Auction," NBER Working Papers 5187, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5187
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Goldberg, Linda S. & Karimov, Il'dar, 1997. "Black markets for currency, hoarding activity and policy reforms," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-4), pages 349-369, May.
    2. Rajnish Mehra & Mr. Robert A Feldman, 1993. "Auctions: Theory and Possible Applications to Economies in Transition," IMF Working Papers 1993/012, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Bulow, Jeremy & Klemperer, Paul, 1994. "Rational Frenzies and Crashes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(1), pages 1-23, February.
    4. Schmeidler, David, 1980. "Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(7), pages 1585-1593, November.
    5. Holt, Charles A & Langan, Loren W & Villamil, Anne P, 1986. "Market Power in Oral Double Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 24(1), pages 107-123, January.
    6. Mr. Arto Kovanen, 1994. "Foreign Exchange Auctions and Fixing: A Review of Performance," IMF Working Papers 1994/119, International Monetary Fund.
    7. repec:bla:kyklos:v:25:y:1972:i:2:p:345-63 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Smith, Vernon L, 1982. "Markets as Economizers of Information: Experimental Examination of the "Hayek Hypothesis"," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 20(2), pages 165-179, April.
    9. Linda S. Goldberg, 1993. "Foreign Exchange Markets in Russia: Understanding the Reforms," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 40(4), pages 852-864, December.
    10. Tenorio, Rafael, 1993. "Revenue Equivalence and Bidding Behavior in a Multi-unit Auction Market: An Empirical Analysis," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 75(2), pages 302-314, May.
    11. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    12. Robert A. Feldman & Rajnish Mehra, 1993. "Auctions: Theory and Applications," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 40(3), pages 485-511, September.
    13. Goldberg, Linda S., 1995. "Exchange rate regime reforms with black market leakages," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 167-187, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Martin D.D. Evans & Richard K. Lyons, 2017. "Order Flow and Exchange Rate Dynamics," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Studies in Foreign Exchange Economics, chapter 6, pages 247-290, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Menkhoff, Lukas & Schmeling, Maik, 2010. "Whose trades convey information? Evidence from a cross-section of traders," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 101-128, February.
    3. Goldberg, Linda S. & Karimov, Il'dar, 1997. "Black markets for currency, hoarding activity and policy reforms," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-4), pages 349-369, May.
    4. X. Fernández, Bernardo & Fernández Q, Vladimir & Aldazosa, E. René, 2018. "Una subasta doble de divisas para la determinación del tipo de cambio en Bolivia," Revista Latinoamericana de Desarrollo Economico, Carrera de Economía de la Universidad Católica Boliviana (UCB) "San Pablo", issue 29, pages 152-189, May.
    5. Menkhoff, Lukas & Schmeling, Maik, 2008. "Local information in foreign exchange markets," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(8), pages 1383-1406, December.
    6. Goldberg, Linda & Tenorio, Rafael, 1997. "Strategic trading in a two-sided foreign exchange auction1," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-4), pages 299-326, May.

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