IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/5062.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Cumulation and ITC Decision-Making: The Sum of the Parts is Greater thanthe Whole

Author

Listed:
  • Wendy L. Hansen
  • Thomas J. Prusa

Abstract

In 1984 Congress amended the antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) laws, mandating that the International Trade Commission (ITC) 'cumulate' imports across countries when determining injury. Since 1984 the cumulation provision has been invoked in over 50 percent of the AD and CVD cases. We estimate that cumulation increases the probability of an affirmative injury determination by 20 to 30 percent and has changed the ITC's decision (from negative to affirmative) for about one-third of cumulated cases. We also show that the protective effect of cumulation increases as the number of countries involved increases, holding import market share constant. That is, cumulated imports have a super-additive effect on ITC decision-making.

Suggested Citation

  • Wendy L. Hansen & Thomas J. Prusa, 1995. "Cumulation and ITC Decision-Making: The Sum of the Parts is Greater thanthe Whole," NBER Working Papers 5062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5062
    Note: ITI
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w5062.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Takacs, Wendy E, 1981. "Pressures for Protectionism: An Empirical Analysis," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 19(4), pages 687-693, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jae W. Chung, 1998. "Effects of U.S. Trade Remedy Law Enforcement under Uncertainty: The Case of Steel," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(1), pages 151-159, July.
    2. Aksel Erbahar & Yuan Zi, 2015. "Cascading Trade Protection: Theory and Evidence from the U.S," CTEI Working Papers series 04-2015, Centre for Trade and Economic Integration, The Graduate Institute.
    3. Lake, James & Linask, Maia K., 2016. "Could tariffs be pro-cyclical?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 124-146.
    4. Enrico Colombatto, 2000. "An Explanation of the Dynamics of Protectionism," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 279-293, July.
    5. César Calderón & Alberto Chong, 2005. "¿Fomentan las democracias conductas de procura de rentas?," Research Department Publications 4416, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    6. Koichi Kagitani, 2003. "Resistance to Trade Liberalization in Unionized Sector," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 419-435, October.
    7. Bruce A. Blonigen & Robert C. Feenstra, 1997. "Protectionist Threats and Foreign Direct Investment," NBER Chapters, in: The Effects of US Trade Protection and Promotion Policies, pages 55-80, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Tansey, Michael & Raju, Sudhakar & Stellern, Michael, 2005. "Price controls, trade protectionism and political business cycles in the U.S. steel industry," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 27(9), pages 1097-1109, December.
    9. Ileana Raquel Jalile, 2020. "Protectionism, competitiveness and business cycles: The Argentinean case," Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers 4359, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política.
    10. Robert Baldwin & Jeffrey Steagall, 1994. "An analysis of ITC decisions in antidumping, countervailing duty and safeguard cases," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 130(2), pages 290-308, June.
    11. Suzanne Tosini & Edward Tower, 1987. "The textile bill of 1985: The determinants of congressional voting patterns," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 19-25, January.
    12. Weck-Hannemann, Hannelore, 1990. "Politische Ökonomie des Protektionismus: Ein institutioneller Ansatz," Discussion Papers, Series II 109, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    13. Reynolds, Kara M., 2006. "Subsidizing rent-seeking: Antidumping protection and the Byrd Amendment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 490-502, December.
    14. Nandana Baruah, 2006. "Antidumping Duties as a Measure of Contingent Protection: an Analysis of Indian Experience," Working Papers id:526, eSocialSciences.
    15. Marcel Vaillant & Marcelo Olarreaga, 2011. "Micro and Macro Determinants of trade temporary barriers: the Brazilian case over the last two decades," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0711, Department of Economics - dECON.
    16. Erbahar, Aksel & Zi, Yuan, 2017. "Cascading trade protection: Evidence from the US," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 274-299.
    17. Kokko, Ari & Gustavsson Tingvall, Patrik & Videnord, Josefin, 2017. "Which Antidumping Cases Reach the WTO?," Ratio Working Papers 286, The Ratio Institute.
    18. Georgios Georgiadis & Johannes Gräb, 2016. "Growth, Real Exchange Rates and Trade Protectionism since the Financial Crisis," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(5), pages 1050-1080, November.
    19. James Lake & Maia K. Linask, 2015. "Domestic political competition and binding overhang in developing countries," Departmental Working Papers 1503, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
    20. Richard T. Cupitt & Euel Elliott, 1994. "Schattschneider Revisited: Senate Voting On The Smoot‐Hawley Tariff Act Of 1930," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 187-199, November.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F0 - International Economics - - General
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5062. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.