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How to Fund Unemployment Insurance with Informality and False Claims: Evidence From Senegal

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  • Abdoulaye Ndiaye
  • Kyle F. Herkenhoff
  • Abdoulaye Cisse
  • Alessandro Dell'Acqua
  • Ahmadou Aly Mbaye

Abstract

This paper studies the welfare effects from the provision of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits in a context where formal workers represent only a small proportion of the labor market and informal workers can submit fraudulent claims for UI benefits. We model these features and allow for varying degrees of enforcement and different funding sources. We then estimate the model’s key parameters by conducting a custom labor force survey in Senegal. Our findings show that the liquidity gains are large and the moral hazard response to the UI benefits among workers is relatively small: an extra dollar of UI benefits yields a consumption-equivalent gain of 60–90 cents, which exceeds comparable estimates from U.S. calibrations by a factor of three to sixteen. We then show that the welfare gains depend on the program design: UI funded through payroll taxes delivers the greatest welfare gains but becomes infeasible when there are few formal workers and high rates of fraudulent claims. On the other hand, UI funded through consumption taxes delivers lower welfare gains but remains feasible with high informality and false claims.

Suggested Citation

  • Abdoulaye Ndiaye & Kyle F. Herkenhoff & Abdoulaye Cisse & Alessandro Dell'Acqua & Ahmadou Aly Mbaye, 2023. "How to Fund Unemployment Insurance with Informality and False Claims: Evidence From Senegal," NBER Working Papers 31571, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31571
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Carvalho, Cristiano C. & Corbi, Raphael & Narita, Renata, 2018. "Unintended consequences of unemployment insurance: Evidence from stricter eligibility criteria in Brazil," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 157-161.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E0 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General
    • E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
    • O55 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Africa

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