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Incentives, Information, and Organizational Design

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  • Joseph E. Stiglitz

Abstract

This paper explores the interaction between incentives, information, and organizational design. It argues that the virtues of the market economy do not lie so much in the vision of competition and decentralization embodied in the Arrow-Debreu model, or the Lange-Lerner-Taylor analysis of market socialism, as they do in those more recent models analyzing competition as contests (Nalebuff-Stiglitz, Lazear-Rosen) and decentralization as a structure of decision making, in environments in which imperfect information is dispersed among numerous individuals (humans are fallible) and accordingly, some method of aggregation has to be found. While the traditional model exaggerates the virtues of the market (whenever markets are incomplete and information is imperfect, market allocations are almost never constrained Pareto efficient), it also understates its virtues: its ability to solve the problems of selection, incentives, and information gathering and aggregation which are the care problems in organizational design. The paper shows how this alternative perspective provides insights into the role that time plays in resource allocation- -for example, patent (R & D) races as well races to be the first to enter a market. We are able to provide an explanation, for instance, for why in times of economic crisis (such as wars) most economies abandon reliance on market mechanisms.

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1989. "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Design," NBER Working Papers 2979, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:2979
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Bolton, Patrick & Farrell, Joseph, 1990. "Decentralization, Duplication, and Delay," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(4), pages 803-826, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Morroni, Mario, 2014. "Production of commodities by means of processes," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 5-18.
    2. Raaj Kumar Sah, 1991. "Fallibility in Human Organizations and Political Systems," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 67-88, Spring.
    3. Nicholas Stern & Joseph E Stiglitz, 2023. "Climate change and growth," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 32(2), pages 277-303.
    4. Frey Bruno S., 1990. "L’Effet De Transfert De Motivation," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 1(3), pages 225-252, October.
    5. Johannes W. Fedderke & Kamil Akramov & Robert E. Klitgaard, 2011. "Heterogeneity Happens: How Rights Matter in Economic Development," Working Papers 220, Economic Research Southern Africa.
    6. Son Ku Kim & Keunkwan Ryu, 2001. "Joint Determination of Internal Organizational Design: Decision-Making, Task Allocation, and Incentive Scheme," ISER Discussion Paper 0550, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    7. Chi, Tailan & Nystrom, Paul C. & Kircher, Philipp, 2004. "Knowledge-based resources as determinants of MNC structure: tests of an integrative model," Journal of International Management, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 219-238.
    8. Avinash Dixit, 1992. "Investment and Hysteresis," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 107-132, Winter.

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