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Relinquishing Riches: Auctions vs Informal Negotiations in Texas Oil and Gas Leasing

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  • Thomas R. Covert
  • Richard L. Sweeney

Abstract

This paper compares outcomes from informally negotiated oil and gas leases to those awarded via centralized auction. We focus on Texas, where legislative decisions in the early twentieth century assigned thousands of proximate parcels to different mineral allocation mechanisms. We show that during the fracking boom, which began unexpectedly decades later, auctioned leases generated at least 40 percent larger upfront payments and 60 percent more output than negotiated leases did. These results suggest large potential gains from employing centralized, formal mechanisms in markets that traditionally allocate in an unstructured fashion, including the broader $3 trillion market for privately owned minerals.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas R. Covert & Richard L. Sweeney, 2019. "Relinquishing Riches: Auctions vs Informal Negotiations in Texas Oil and Gas Leasing," NBER Working Papers 25712, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25712
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    Cited by:

    1. Evan M. Herrnstadt & Ryan Kellogg & Eric Lewis, 2020. "The Economics of Time-Limited Development Options: The Case of Oil and Gas Leases," NBER Working Papers 27165, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Diego Carrasco-Novoa & Allan Hernández-Chanto, 2022. "Competing Sellers in Security-Bid Auctions under Risk-Averse Bidders," Discussion Papers Series 655, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    3. Janssen, Aljoscha, 2022. "Innovation Begets Innovation and Concentration: The Case of Upstream Oil & Gas in the North Sea," Working Paper Series 1431, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    4. Michele Fioretti & Alessandro Iaria & Aljoscha Janssen & Robert K Perrons & Clément Mazet-Sonilhac, 2022. "Innovation Begets Innovation and Concentration: the Case of Upstream Oil & Gas in the North Sea," SciencePo Working papers hal-03791971, HAL.
    5. Daniel Berkowitz, 2022. "Rational but Not Prescient: Borrowing during the Fracking Boom," Working Paper 7314, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
    6. Daniel Berkowitz & Andrew J. dup Boslett & Jason Brown & Jeremy G. Weber, 2022. "Rational but Not Prescient: Borrowing during the Fracking Boom," Research Working Paper RWP 2022-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • Q35 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Hydrocarbon Resources

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