Related Investing: Corporate Ownership and Capital Mobilization during Early Industrialization
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
- N21 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
- N81 - Economic History - - Micro-Business History - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CFN-2017-01-29 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-HIS-2017-01-29 (Business, Economic and Financial History)
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