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Intergenerational Altruism and Social Welfare: A Critique of the Dynastic Model

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  • B. Douglas Bernheim

Abstract

In this paper, I show that, under relatively weak conditions, dynastic equilibria are never welfare optima. If a social planner sets policy to maximize a social welfare function, then, except in extreme cases where the planner cares only about a single generation, successive generations will never be linked through altruistically motivated transfers. This suggests that the dynastic model is unsuitable for normative analysis, and, to the extent governments actually behave in this manner, the model is also inappropriate for positive analysis. In addition, I show that, except in a few special cases, the planner's preferences are dynamically inconsistent. If the planner can successfully resolve this inconsistency, then the central result is somewhat modified.

Suggested Citation

  • B. Douglas Bernheim, 1987. "Intergenerational Altruism and Social Welfare: A Critique of the Dynastic Model," NBER Working Papers 2288, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:2288
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Chamley, Christophe, 1981. "The Welfare Cost of Capital Income Taxation in a Growing Economy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(3), pages 468-496, June.
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    3. Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "The Welfare Cost of Factor Taxation in a Perfect-Foresight Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(4), pages 675-709, August.
    4. Bernheim, B Douglas & Shleifer, Andrei & Summers, Lawrence H, 1986. "The Strategic Bequest Motive," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(3), pages 151-182, July.
    5. Abel, Andrew B & Bernheim, B Douglas, 1991. "Fiscal Policy with Impure Intergenerational Altruism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1687-1711, November.
    6. Bernheim, B Douglas & Bagwell, Kyle, 1988. "Is Everything Neutral?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(2), pages 308-338, April.
    7. Willem H. Buiter & James Tobin, 1978. "Fiscal and Monetary Policies, Capital Formation, and Economic Activity," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 512, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    8. R. A. Pollak, 1968. "Consistent Planning," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 35(2), pages 201-208.
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    10. Stephen A. O'Connell & Stephen P. Zeldes, "undated". "Ponzi Games and Ricardian Equivalence," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 12-87, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mohr, Ernst, 1987. "A general equilibrium model of sovereign borrowing and non-sovereign financial intermediation," Discussion Papers, Series II 40, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".

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