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The Financial Feasibility of Delaying Social Security: Evidence from Administrative Tax Data

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  • Gopi Shah Goda
  • Shanthi Ramnath
  • John B. Shoven
  • Sita Nataraj Slavov

Abstract

Despite the large and growing returns to deferring Social Security benefits, most individuals claim Social Security before the full retirement age, currently age 66. In this paper, we use a panel of administrative tax data on likely primary earners to explore some potential hypotheses of why individuals fail to delay claiming Social Security, including liquidity constraints and private information regarding one’s expected future lifetime. We find that approximately 31-34% of beneficiaries who claim prior to the full retirement age have assets in Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) that would fund at least 2 additional years of Social Security benefits, and 24-26% could fund at least 4 years of Social Security deferral with IRA assets alone. Our analysis suggests that these percentages would be considerably higher if other assets were taken into account. We find evidence that those who claim prior to the full retirement age have higher subjective and actual mortality rates than those who claim later, suggesting that private information about expected future lifetimes may influence claiming behavior.

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  • Gopi Shah Goda & Shanthi Ramnath & John B. Shoven & Sita Nataraj Slavov, 2015. "The Financial Feasibility of Delaying Social Security: Evidence from Administrative Tax Data," NBER Working Papers 21544, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21544
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    1. Mariacristina De Nardi & Eric French & John B. Jones, 2010. "Why Do the Elderly Save? The Role of Medical Expenses," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(1), pages 39-75, February.
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    5. John Shoven & Sita Slavov, 2013. "Recent Changes In The Gains From Delaying Social Security," Discussion Papers 13-019, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    6. Luc Behaghel & David M. Blau, 2012. "Framing Social Security Reform: Behavioral Responses to Changes in the Full Retirement Age," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 41-67, November.
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    9. Jingjing Chai & Raimond Maurer & Olivia S. Mitchell & Ralph Rogalla, 2012. "Exchanging Delayed Social Security Benefits for Lump Sums: Could This Incentivize Longer Work Careers?," Working Papers wp266, University of Michigan, Michigan Retirement Research Center.
    10. Wei Sun & Anthony Webb, 2009. "How Much Do Households Really Lose By Claiming Social Security at Age 62?," Working Papers, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College wp2009-11, Center for Retirement Research, revised Apr 2009.
    11. Shoven, John B. & Slavov, Sita Nataraj, 2014. "Does it pay to delay social security?," Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(2), pages 121-144, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Duggan, Mark & Dushi, Irena & Jeong, Sookyo & Li, Gina, 2023. "The effects of changes in social security’s delayed retirement credit: Evidence from administrative data," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 223(C).
    2. Raimond Maurer & Olivia S. Mitchell & Ralph Rogalla & Tatjana Schimetschek, 2021. "Optimal social security claiming behavior under lump sum incentives: Theory and evidence," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 88(1), pages 5-27, March.
    3. Mary J. Lopez & Sita Slavov, 2020. "Do immigrants delay retirement and social security claiming?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 52(10), pages 1105-1123, February.
    4. Jason S. Scott & John B. Shoven & Sita N. Slavov & John G. Watson, 2020. "Can Low Retirement Savings Be Rationalized?," NBER Working Papers 26784, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. John B. Shoven & Sita Nataraj Slavov & David A. Wise, 2017. "Social Security Claiming Decisions: Survey Evidence," NBER Working Papers 23729, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Bronshtein, Gila & Scott, Jason & Shoven, John B. & Slavov, Sita Nataraj, 2020. "Leaving big money on the table: Arbitrage opportunities in delaying social security," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 261-272.
    7. Arthur Seibold, 2019. "Reference Points for Retirement Behavior: Evidence from German Pension Discontinuities," CESifo Working Paper Series 7799, CESifo.
    8. Svetlana Pashchenko & Ponpoje Porapakkarm, 2024. "Accounting For Social Security Claiming Behavior," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 65(1), pages 505-545, February.
    9. Robert L. Clark & Robert G. Hammond & Melinda S. Morrill & David Vanderweide, 2017. "Annuity Options in Public Pension Plans: The Curious Case of Social Security Leveling," NBER Working Papers 23262, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Philip Armour & Angela A. Hung, 2017. "Drawing Down Retirement Wealth Interactions between Social Security Wealth and Private Retirement Savings," Working Papers WR-1165, RAND Corporation.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D14 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Saving; Personal Finance
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions

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