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The Rise and Fall of Demand for Securitizations

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  • Sergey Chernenko
  • Samuel G. Hanson
  • Adi Sunderam

Abstract

Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and private-label mortgage-backed securities (MBS) backed by nonprime loans played a central role in the recent financial crisis. Little is known, however, about the underlying forces that drove investor demand for these securitizations. Using micro-data on insurers’ and mutual funds’ bond holdings, we find considerable heterogeneity in investor demand for securitizations in the pre-crisis period. We argue that both investor beliefs and incentives help to explain this variation in demand. By contrast, our data paints a more uniform picture of investor behavior in the crisis. Consistent with theories of optimal liquidation, investors largely traded in more liquid securities such as government-guaranteed MBS to meet their liquidity needs during the crisis.

Suggested Citation

  • Sergey Chernenko & Samuel G. Hanson & Adi Sunderam, 2014. "The Rise and Fall of Demand for Securitizations," NBER Working Papers 20777, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20777
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    2. Yavuz Arslan & Bulent Guler & Burhan Kuruscu, 2020. "Credit Supply Driven Boom-Bust Cycles," Working Papers tecipa-664, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    3. Mr. Ehsan Ebrahimy, 2019. "Fire Sales in Frozen Markets," IMF Working Papers 2019/092, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Marco Di Maggio & Amir Kermani & Christopher Palmer, 2016. "How Quantitative Easing Works: Evidence on the Refinancing Channel," NBER Working Papers 22638, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. E. Chrétien & V. Lyonnet, 2017. "Traditional and Shadow Banks during the Crisis," Débats économiques et financiers 27, Banque de France.
    6. Merrill, Craig B. & Nadauld, Taylor D. & Stulz, René M. & Sherlun, Shane M., 2021. "Were there fire sales in the RMBS market?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 17-37.
    7. Felipe S. Iachan & Plamen T. Nenov & Alp Simsek, 2021. "The Choice Channel of Financial Innovation," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(2), pages 333-372, April.
    8. Efing, Matthias, 2015. "Arbitraging the Basel securitization framework: Evidence from German ABS investment," Discussion Papers 40/2015, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    9. Uhlig, Harald & Ospina, Juan, 2018. "Mortgage-Backed Securities and the Financial Crisis of 2008: a Post Mortem," CEPR Discussion Papers 12852, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Ujjal Chatterjee, 2023. "Predicting economic growth: evidence from real-estate loans securitization," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 1-20, March.
    11. Nourzad, Farrokh & Hunter, William & Szczesniak, Katherine, 2020. "Securitization of revolving debt and its determinants," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 240-246.
    12. James N. Conklin & Haoyang Liu & Calvin Zhang, 2024. "Credit supply shocks, home purchase volume, and borrowing behavior," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 52(2), pages 486-513, March.
    13. Bayeh, Antonio & Bitar, Mohammad & Burlacu, Radu & Walker, Thomas, 2021. "Competition, securitization, and efficiency in US banks," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 553-576.
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    15. Lewellen, Stefan & Williams, Emily, 2021. "Did technology contribute to the housing boom? Evidence from MERS," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(3), pages 1244-1261.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors

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