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Reassessing FHA Risk

Author

Listed:
  • Diego Aragon
  • Andrew Caplin
  • Sumit Chopra
  • John V. Leahy
  • Yann LeCun
  • Marco Scoffier
  • Joseph Tracy

Abstract

Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insurance has doubled over the past two years and is projected to redouble to $1.5 trillion over the next five. Despite clear signs of strain in the FHA's Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund, a recent actuarial review indicates that the FHA will not need any form of government support. We identify four risk factors that make such a funding request more likely; the review underestimates how many FHA borrowers are underwater and in economic distress; it uses measures of house values that lower loss estimates; it does not incorporate early-warning signals of future losses that are available from mortgage delinquency; and it ignores potential risks associated with recent down-payment assistant programs despite higher losses on previous programs of this type. We propose measures that could be taken to improve the predictive accuracy of FHA risk assessment.

Suggested Citation

  • Diego Aragon & Andrew Caplin & Sumit Chopra & John V. Leahy & Yann LeCun & Marco Scoffier & Joseph Tracy, 2010. "Reassessing FHA Risk," NBER Working Papers 15802, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15802
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kristopher Gerardi & Adam Hale Shapiro & Paul S. Willen, 2007. "Subprime outcomes: risky mortgages, homeownership experiences, and foreclosures," Working Papers 07-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    2. Foote, Christopher L. & Gerardi, Kristopher & Willen, Paul S., 2008. "Negative equity and foreclosure: Theory and evidence," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 234-245, September.
    3. Calhoun, Charles A & Deng, Yongheng, 2002. "A Dynamic Analysis of Fixed- and Adjustable-Rate Mortgage Terminations," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 24(1-2), pages 9-33, Jan.-Marc.
    4. Caplin, Andrew & Freeman, Charles & Tracy, Joseph, 1997. "Collateral Damage: Refinancing Constraints and Regional Recessions," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(4), pages 496-516, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Anthony A. Defusco & John Mondragon, 2020. "No Job, No Money, No Refi: Frictions to Refinancing in a Recession," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(5), pages 2327-2376, October.
    2. Steven Laufer, 2018. "Equity Extraction and Mortgage Default," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 28, pages 1-33, April.
    3. Joseph Gyourko & Joseph Tracy, 2013. "Unemloyment and Unobserved Credit Risk in the FHA Single Family Mortgage Insurance Fund," NBER Working Papers 18880, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Chan, Sewin & Gedal, Michael & Been, Vicki & Haughwout, Andrew, 2013. "The role of neighborhood characteristics in mortgage default risk: Evidence from New York City," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 100-118.
    5. Manuel Adelino & William B. McCartney & Antoinette Schoar, 2020. "The Role of Government and Private Institutions in Credit Cycles in the U.S. Mortgage Market," NBER Working Papers 27499, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Manuel Adelino & W. Ben McCartney & Antoinette Schoar, 2020. "The Role of Government and Private Institutions in Credit Cycles in the U.S. Mortgage Market," Working Papers 20-40, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    7. Brent Smith, 2012. "Lending Through the Cycle: The Federal Housing Administration’s Evolving Risk in the Primary Market," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 40(3), pages 253-271, September.
    8. James A Kahn & Benjamin S Kay, 2020. "The impact of credit risk mispricing on mortgage lending during the subprime boom," BIS Working Papers 875, Bank for International Settlements.
    9. Finn Poschmann, 2011. "What Governments Should Do in Mortgage Markets," C.D. Howe Institute Commentary, C.D. Howe Institute, issue 318, January.
    10. Francesca Castelli & Damien Moore & Gabriel Ehrlich & Jeffrey Perry, 2014. "Modeling the Budgetary Costs of FHA's Single Family Mortgage Insurance: Working Paper 2014-05," Working Papers 45711, Congressional Budget Office.
    11. James A. Kahn & Benjamin S. Kay, 2019. "The Impact of Credit Risk Mispricing on Mortgage Lending during the Subprime Boom," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2019-046, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    12. Patricia C. Mosser & Joseph Tracy & Joshua Wright, 2013. "The capital structure and governance of a mortgage securitization utility," Staff Reports 644, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D14 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Saving; Personal Finance
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H81 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts

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