Storable Votes and Agenda Order Control. Theory and Experiments
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- Casella, Alessandra, 2008. "Storable Votes and Agenda Order Control. Theory and Experiments," CEPR Discussion Papers 7050, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alessandra Casella, 2008. "Storable Votes and Agenda Order Control. Theory and Experiments," Working Papers halshs-00349292, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Casella, Alessandra & Riezman, Raymond & Palfrey, Thomas R, 2005. "Minorities and Storable Votes," CEPR Discussion Papers 5278, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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- Casella, Alessandra, 2011. "Agenda control as a cheap talk game: Theory and experiments with Storable Votes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 46-76, May.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2008-11-18 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2008-11-18 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2008-11-18 (Positive Political Economics)
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