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Institutions and U.S. Regional Development: A Study of Massachusetts and Virginia

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  • Sukkoo Kim

Abstract

The development of the American economy was accompanied by significant spatial income inequalities between the northern and southern regions. While many factors contributed to northern industrialization and southern stagnation, an important factor was differences in their institutions. In the North, a democratic institution fostered growth whereas in the South, an oligarchic institution favored status quo. To gain some insights on the nature and causes of the divergence of these institutions, this paper examines the development of political and legal institutions in Massachusetts and Virginia, the two leading states in the North and the South.

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  • Sukkoo Kim, 2007. "Institutions and U.S. Regional Development: A Study of Massachusetts and Virginia," NBER Working Papers 13431, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13431
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    Cited by:

    1. Abdoul' Ganiou Mijiyawa & Alexander Kremer & Loïc Whitmore, 2012. "Does Mena'S Governance Lead To Spatial Agglomeration?," Middle East Development Journal (MEDJ), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 4(02), pages 1-23.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • N41 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913

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