On Inducing Agents with Term Limits to Take Appropriate Risk
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More about this item
Keywords
term-limits; elections; principal-agent; discretion; replacement;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-MIC-2017-10-01 (Microeconomics)
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