IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/mse/wpsorb/r04052.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Individual action, institutions and social change: an approach in terms of convention

Author

Listed:
  • Bernard Enjolras

    (Institute for social research et MATISSE)

Abstract

This anthology consists of a collection of articles that address two common questions: how institutions emerge from individual actions and how individual actions are shaped by institutions? What unifies these contributions is the search of a theoretical explanation that overcomes the shortcomings of the rational choice explanations of social institutions. The approach developed here deals with two methodological problems that are pervasive in social sciences: that of the relationship between agency and structures and that of role of rationality and norms in explaining individual social behaviour. Individuals are seen to be acting according to «conventions» that structure their interaction and that are cognitive and interpretative schemes that allow them to understand social reality and to give meaning to their actions. In addition individuals do not act either rationally or normatively but are conceived as acting within a «conventional» context that gives meaning to their action but also constrains them. They are supposed to be moved both by normative considerations and by self-interest that can conflict

Suggested Citation

  • Bernard Enjolras, 2004. "Individual action, institutions and social change: an approach in terms of convention," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques r04052, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    • Handle: RePEc:mse:wpsorb:r04052
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/cahiers2004/R04052.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Henry Hansmann, 1981. "Nonprofit Enterprise in the Performing Arts," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 341-361, Autumn.
    2. Baumol, William J, 1982. "Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 1-15, March.
    3. Sandmo, Agnar, 1991. "Economists and the welfare state," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 35(2-3), pages 213-239, April.
    4. Easley, David & O'Hara, Maureen, 1988. "Contracts and asymmetric information in the theory of the firm," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 229-246, April.
    5. Frech, H E, III, 1976. "The Property Rights Theory of the Firm: Empirical Results from a Natural Experiment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(1), pages 143-152, February.
    6. Banks,Jeffrey S. & Hanushek,Eric Allen (ed.), 1995. "Modern Political Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521478106, September.
    7. Majone, Giandomenico, 1997. "From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 17(2), pages 139-167, May.
    8. repec:bla:kyklos:v:32:y:1979:i:4:p:775-801 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Banks,Jeffrey S. & Hanushek,Eric Allen (ed.), 1995. "Modern Political Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521472333, September.
    10. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 2001. "Competition in Telecommunications," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262621509, April.
    11. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, April.
    12. Elisha A. Pazner & David Schmeidler, 1978. "Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 92(4), pages 671-687.
    13. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Procurement and Renegotiation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(2), pages 235-259, April.
    14. David Easley & Maureen O'Hara, 1983. "The Economic Role of the Nonprofit Firm," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 531-538, Autumn.
    15. Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1984. "Pecuniary & Market Mediated Externalities: Towards a General Theory of the Welfare Economics & Economies with Imperfect Information & Incomplete Mrkts," NBER Working Papers 1304, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Elster, Jon, 1989. "Social Norms and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 99-117, Fall.
    17. De Alessi, Louis, 1983. "Property Rights, Transaction Costs, and X-Efficiency: An Essay in Economic Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(1), pages 64-81, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bassanini, Anna & Pouyet, Jerome, 2005. "Strategic choice of financing systems in regulated and interconnected industries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2-3), pages 233-259, February.
    2. Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2000. "How to Auction an Essential Facility when Underhand Integration is Possible," Documentos de Trabajo 79, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    3. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 2003. "Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1176-1206, September.
    4. Bergman, Mats, 2003. "When Should an Incumbent Be Obliged to Share its Infrastructure with an Entrant Under the General Competition Rules?," Working Paper Series 2003:25, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    5. Gullì, F., 2003. "Distributed Generation versus Centralised Supply: a Social Cost-Benefit Analysis," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0336, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    6. Drew Fudenberg, 2015. "Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 117(3), pages 771-800, July.
    7. Holmstrom, Bengt R. & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "The theory of the firm," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 61-133, Elsevier.
    8. Eric Maskin, 2004. "Jean-Jacques Laffont: A Look Back," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(5), pages 913-923, September.
    9. Ilie, Laura & Losada, Ramiro, 2004. "Endogenous financing of the universal service," UC3M Working papers. Economics we044116, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    10. Leslie Bravo Chew & Luis Fernando Gamboa, 2006. "Subsidios cruzados: el caso del sector postal," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 8(15), pages 251-268, July-Dece.
    11. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2014. "Market power and regulation (scientific background)," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2014-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
    12. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.
    13. Rodrigo M. S. Moita & Claudio Paiva, 2013. "Political Price Cycles in Regulated Industries: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 94-121, February.
    14. Strausz, Roland, 2006. "Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal-agent models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 128(1), pages 306-314, May.
    15. Philippe Choné & Laurent Flochel & Anne Perrot, 1999. "Allocating and Funding Universal Service Obligations in a Competitive Network Market," Working Papers 99-55, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    16. Juan Pablo Montero, 1998. "Optimal Opt-in "Climate" Contracts," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 1, pages 363-384, November.
    17. Gonzalez, P., 1999. "Specific Investment, Absence of Commitment and Observability," Papers 99-03, Laval - Recherche en Energie.
    18. Elert, Niklas & Henrekson, Magnus, 2017. "Entrepreneurship and Institutions: A Bidirectional Relationship," Working Paper Series 1153, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 05 May 2017.
    19. François MARECHAL, 2003. "Should we base procurement rules on the competition of linear incentive contracts ?," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 03.07, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    20. Patrick Gonzàlez, 2004. "Investment and Screening Under Asymmetric Endogenous Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(3), pages 502-519, Autumn.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Convention; norm; rationality; collective action; agency; structure; social action; institution; governance; social change; community; nonprofit organizations; institutions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
    • L3 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
    • L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
    • L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mse:wpsorb:r04052. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Lucie Label (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/msep1fr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.