IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/mpg/wpaper/2010_09.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Ambiguous Act Equilibria

Author

Listed:
  • Sophie Bade

    (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)

Abstract

A game-theoretic framework that allows for explicitly randomized strategies is used to study the effect of ambiguity aversion on equilibrium outcomes. The notions of "independent strategies" as well as of "common priors" are amended to render them applicable to games in which players lack probabilistic sophistication. Within this framework the equilibrium predictions of two player games with ambiguity averse and with ambiguity neutral players are observationally equivalent. This equivalence result does not extend to the case of games with more than two players. A translation of the concept of equilibrium in beliefs to the context of ambiguity aversion yields substantially di erent predictions – even for the case with just two players.

Suggested Citation

  • Sophie Bade, 2010. "Ambiguous Act Equilibria," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010_09, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    • Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2010_09
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2010_09online.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. , & , & ,, 2006. "Optimal auctions with ambiguity," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(4), pages 411-438, December.
    2. Cerreia-Vioglio, S. & Maccheroni, F. & Marinacci, M. & Montrucchio, L., 2011. "Uncertainty averse preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1275-1330, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kellner, Christian & Le Quement, Mark T., 2018. "Endogenous ambiguity in cheap talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 1-17.
    2. Kellner, Christian & Le Quement, Mark T., 2017. "Modes of ambiguous communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 271-292.
    3. Riedel, Frank & Sass, Linda, 2016. "The strategic use of ambiguity," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 452, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Luciano De Castro & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2011. "Ambiguity aversion solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1106, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    2. Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Luciano De Castro, 2010. "Uncertainty, Efficiency and Incentive Compatibility," Discussion Papers 1532, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Azrieli, Yaron & Teper, Roee, 2011. "Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 310-317.
    4. De Castro, Luciano & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2018. "Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: Ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 678-707.
    5. Lang, Matthias & Wambach, Achim, 2013. "The fog of fraud – Mitigating fraud by strategic ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 255-275.
    6. Sosung Baik & Sung-Ha Hwang, 2022. "Revenue Comparisons of Auctions with Ambiguity Averse Sellers," Papers 2211.12669, arXiv.org.
    7. Bade, Sophie, 2011. "Ambiguous act equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 246-260, March.
    8. Rosenberg, Dinah & Vieille, Nicolas, 2019. "Zero-sum games with ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 238-249.
    9. Carvalho, M., 2012. "Static vs Dynamic Auctions with Ambiguity Averse Bidders," Other publications TiSEM 1f078e67-88ec-46e3-ae18-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    10. Agliardi, Elettra & Xepapadeas, Anastasios, 2022. "Temperature targets, deep uncertainty and extreme events in the design of optimal climate policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    11. Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Luciano De Castro, 2010. "Prediction Markets to Forecast Electricity Demand," Discussion Papers 1529, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    12. Maximilian Blesch & Philipp Eisenhauer, 2021. "Robust decision-making under risk and ambiguity," Papers 2104.12573, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2021.
    13. Song, Yangwei, 2018. "Efficient Implementation with Interdependent Valuations and Maxmin Agents," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 92, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    14. repec:ipg:wpaper:2013-029 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Blavatskyy, Pavlo R., 2013. "Two examples of ambiguity aversion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 206-208.
    16. Frick, Mira & Iijima, Ryota & Le Yaouanq, Yves, 2022. "Objective rationality foundations for (dynamic) α-MEU," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    17. Casaca, Paulo & Chateauneuf, Alain & Faro, José Heleno, 2014. "Ignorance and competence in choices under uncertainty," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 143-150.
    18. Dong, Xueqi & Liu, Shuo Li, 2021. "Proportional Tax under Ambiguity," MPRA Paper 107668, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Dirk Bergemann & Karl Schlag, 2012. "Robust Monopoly Pricing," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 13, pages 417-441, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    20. Enrico G. De Giorgi & David B. Brown & Melvyn Sim, 2010. "Dual representation of choice and aspirational preferences," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2010 2010-07, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
    21. Song, Yangwei, 2022. "Approximate Bayesian Implementation and Exact Maxmin Implementation: An Equivalence," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 362, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Uncertainty Aversion; Nash Equilibrium; Ambiguity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2010_09. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Marc Martin (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/mppggde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.