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L’approvisionnement gazier sur un marche oligopolistique : une analyse par la théorie économique

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  • Girault Vincent

Abstract

L’objectif de notre analyse est de déterminer quels sont les facteurs qui influencent le portefeuille d’approvisionnement d’un entrant sur le marché gazier européen. L’augmentation de la dépendance des importateurs européens, la sécurité des approvisionnements et la diversification des offres d’énergies entraînent une concurrence oligopolistique sur le marché européen. Les acteurs, gaziers ou électriciens du marché européen, adaptent leurs comportements pour faire face à la concurrence et aux réactions des producteurs gaziers. La construction d’un portefeuille d’approvisionnement est déterminante pour permettre aux firmes européennes de se concurrencer.

Suggested Citation

  • Girault Vincent, 2005. "L’approvisionnement gazier sur un marche oligopolistique : une analyse par la théorie économique," Cahiers du CREDEN (CREDEN Working Papers) 05.04.56, CREDEN (Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit de l'Energie), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1.
    • Handle: RePEc:mop:credwp:05.04.56
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    File URL: http://www.creden.univ-montp1.fr/downloads/cahiers/CC-05-04-56.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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