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Ownership Rights versus Access Rights Allocation to Critical Resources: An Empirical Study of the Economic Impact of Changes in Oil Governance

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  • Mohammad Kemal

    (Division of Economics and Business, Colorado School of Mines)

Abstract

During the 1970s, many oil-producing countries gave National Oil Companies (NOC's) ownership rights to oil and gas resources. Following the success of Norway in managing its oil and gas resources, development institutions have tried to push oil-producing countries to change their oil governance. Over the past two decades, several countries have enacted laws that create a regulatory entity and establish the NOC only as a business entity. Thus, these NOCs now are only given access rights to explore and produce oil and gas like other international oil companies. Employing a difference-in-difference method, this paper aims to empirically investigate the impact of changes in oil governance, specifically of changes in allocation of ownership rights versus access rights, to aggregate domestic income. Using data from 35 countries in the period 1990-2012, our results suggest that a country which creates a separate regulatory entity and makes the NOC merely a business entity increases its aggregate domestic income by around 10%.

Suggested Citation

  • Mohammad Kemal, 2016. "Ownership Rights versus Access Rights Allocation to Critical Resources: An Empirical Study of the Economic Impact of Changes in Oil Governance," Working Papers 2016-02, Colorado School of Mines, Division of Economics and Business.
    • Handle: RePEc:mns:wpaper:wp201602
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    File URL: http://econbus-papers.mines.edu/working-papers/wp201602.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    oil governance; access rights regulation; economic growth;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q3 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy

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