Do Campaign Finance Policies Really Improve Voters' Welfare?
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Cited by:
- Thomas Bassetti & Filippo Pavesi, 2012. "Deep Pockets, Extreme Preferences: Interest Groups and Campaign Finance Contributions," Working Papers 222, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2012.
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More about this item
Keywords
Campaign Finance; Interest Groups; Elections; Welfare;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-POL-2011-05-07 (Positive Political Economics)
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