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Informative Positive and Negative Campaigning

Author

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  • Polborn, Mattias K.
  • David T., Yi

Abstract

This paper develops a theoretical model of informative campaigning, both positive and negative. We argue that some information on a candidate can be transmitted more efficiently by his opponents and that negative campaigning, on average, facilitates a more informed choice by the electorate. In our model, voters have incomplete information about candidates' qualities. Each candidate can either lead a positive campaign , defined as issue-focused, indicating his high quality, or a negative campaign , defined as revealing detrimental information about his competitor. Voters receive the information that candidates choose to reveal and rationally update their beliefs about the remaining issues. We derive the equilibrium behavior of candidates in this framework and compare it to stylized facts of negative campaigning reported in the empirical literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Polborn, Mattias K. & David T., Yi, 2006. "Informative Positive and Negative Campaigning," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 1(4), pages 351-371, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00000013
    DOI: 10.1561/100.00000013
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    Cited by:

    1. Raphaël Soubeyran, 2009. "Contest with attack and defense: does negative campaigning increase or decrease voter turnout?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(3), pages 337-353, March.
    2. Burkhard Schipper & Hee Yeul Woo, 2014. "Political Awareness, Microtargeting of Voters, and Negative Electoral Campaigning," Working Papers 148, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    3. Isaac Duerr & Thomas Knight & Lindsey Woodworth, 2019. "Evidence on the Effect of Political Platform Transparency on Partisan Voting," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 45(3), pages 331-349, June.
    4. Chad Kendall & Tommaso Nannicini & Francesco Trebbi, 2015. "How Do Voters Respond to Information? Evidence from a Randomized Campaign," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(1), pages 322-353, January.
    5. Maarten C. W. Janssen & Mariya Teteryatnikova, 2015. "On the Positive Role of Negative Political Campaigning," Vienna Economics Papers vie1506, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    6. Amit Gandhi & Daniela Iorio & Carly Urban, 2016. "Negative Advertising and Political Competition," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(3), pages 433-477.
    7. Filippo Gregorini & Filippo Pavesi, 2011. "Do Campaign Finance Policies Really Improve Voters' Welfare?," Working Papers 209, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2011.
    8. Baharad, Roy & Cohen, Chen & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2022. "Litigation with adversarial efforts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    9. Denter, Philipp, 2020. "Campaign contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    10. Bernhardt, Dan & Ghosh, Meenakshi, 2020. "Positive and negative campaigning in primary and general elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 98-104.
    11. Sourav Bhattacharya, 2011. "Campaign Rhetoric and the Hide-&-Seek Game," Working Paper 457, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Nov 2012.
    12. Sourav Bhattacharya, 2006. "Campaign Rhetoric and the Hide-and-Seek Game," Working Paper 326, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Jun 2007.
    13. Jan Brueckner & Kangoh Lee, 2015. "Negative campaigning in a probabilistic voting model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(3), pages 379-399, September.
    14. Schipper, Burkhard C. & Woo, Hee Yeul, 2019. "Political Awareness, Microtargeting of Voters, and Negative Electoral Campaigning," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 14(1), pages 41-88, January.
    15. Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2010. "Persuasion by Cheap Talk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2361-2382, December.
      • Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2006. "Persuasion by Cheap Talk," Working Papers 2006-10, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, revised Oct 2009.
    16. Wataru Tamura, 2012. "A Theory of Multidimensional Information Disclosure," ISER Discussion Paper 0828, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    17. Maarten C. W. Janssen & Mariya Teteryatnikova, 2015. "On the Positive Role of Negative Political Campaigning," Vienna Economics Papers 1506, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    18. Brett R. Gordon & Mitchell J. Lovett & Bowen Luo & James C. Reeder, 2023. "Disentangling the Effects of Ad Tone on Voter Turnout and Candidate Choice in Presidential Elections," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(1), pages 220-243, January.
    19. Maarten C. W. Janssen & Mariya Teteryatnikova, 2017. "Mystifying but not misleading: when does political ambiguity not confuse voters?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(3), pages 501-524, September.
    20. Li Hao & Wei Li, 2013. "Misinformation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54(1), pages 253-277, February.
    21. Qiang Gong & Jie Shuai & Huanxing Yang, 2023. "Informational correlation and selective disclosure," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(2), pages 645-683, August.
    22. Sourav Bhattacharya, 2016. "Campaign rhetoric and the hide-and-seek game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(3), pages 697-727, October.

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