Worst-case Regret in Ambiguous Dynamic Games
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More about this item
Keywords
dynamic games; repeated games; regret minimization;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2022-12-19 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2022-12-19 (Microeconomics)
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