The Evolution of Collaboration in Symmetric 2x2-Games with Imperfect Recognition of Types
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More about this item
Keywords
cooperation; collaboration; strategy choice; evolution;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EVO-2017-10-15 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-HPE-2017-10-15 (History and Philosophy of Economics)
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