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Stability and Cooperative Solution in Stochastic Games

Author

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  • Alessandro Tampieri

    (CREA, Université du Luxembourg)

  • Elena M. Parilina

    (Saint Petersburg State University)

Abstract

Cooperative game theory is effective in explaining many economic interactions, such as risk-sharing agreements or the enforcing role of social norms. In a stochastic environ- ment, the analysis of these issues is generalised by taking into account the presence of shocks. The paper finds the conditions of dynamic stability for cooperative stochastic games. Principles of dynamic stability include three conditions: subgame consistency, strategic stability and irrational-behaviour-proof of the cooperative agreement.

Suggested Citation

  • Alessandro Tampieri & Elena M. Parilina, 2014. "Stability and Cooperative Solution in Stochastic Games," DEM Discussion Paper Series 14-26, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
    • Handle: RePEc:luc:wpaper:14-26
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    File URL: https://hdl.handle.net/10993/18930
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    Cited by:

    1. Elena Parilina & Stepan Akimochkin, 2021. "Cooperative Stochastic Games with Mean-Variance Preferences," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-15, January.
    2. Elena M. Parilina & Georges Zaccour, 2022. "Sustainable Cooperation in Dynamic Games on Event Trees with Players’ Asymmetric Beliefs," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 194(1), pages 92-120, July.
    3. Al-Jarhi, Mabid Ali M. M., 2016. "An Economic Theory of Islamic Finance Regulation," Islamic Economic Studies, The Islamic Research and Training Institute (IRTI), vol. 24, pages 1-44.
    4. Troncoso-Valverde, Cristián & Chávez-Bustamante, Felipe, 2024. "Do you want to know a secret? Strategic alliances and competition in product markets," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 313(3), pages 1180-1190.
    5. Elena Parilina & Leon Petrosyan, 2020. "On a Simplified Method of Defining Characteristic Function in Stochastic Games," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(7), pages 1-14, July.
    6. Parilina, Elena M. & Zaccour, Georges, 2022. "Payment schemes for sustaining cooperation in dynamic games," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperative Stochastic Game; stationary strategies; time consistency; subgame consistency; strategic stability; irrational-behaviour-proof;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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