IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/lsu/lsuwpp/2011-11.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Efficient Networks in Models of Player and Partner Heterogeneity

Author

Listed:
  • Emre Unlu

Abstract

This paper contributes to the literature on centrality measures in economics by defining a team game and identifying the key players in the game. As an illustration of the theory we create a unique data set from the UEFA Euro 2008 tournament. To capture the interaction between players we create the passing network of each team. This all allows us to identify the key player and key groups of players for both teams in each game. We then use our measure to explain player ratings by experts and their market values. Our measure is significant in explaining expert ratings. We also find that players having higher intercentrality measures, regardless of their field position have significantly higher market values.

Suggested Citation

  • Emre Unlu, 2011. "Efficient Networks in Models of Player and Partner Heterogeneity," Departmental Working Papers 2011-11, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.
    • Handle: RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2011-11
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.lsu.edu/business/economics/files/workingpapers/pap11_11.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard & Sudipta Sarangi, 2011. "Strict Nash networks and partner heterogeneity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(3), pages 515-525, August.
    2. Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 1996. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 44-74, October.
    3. Venkatesh Bala & Sanjeev Goyal, 2000. "original papers : A strategic analysis of network reliability," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 5(3), pages 205-228.
    4. Galeotti, Andrea & Goyal, Sanjeev & Kamphorst, Jurjen, 2006. "Network formation with heterogeneous players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 353-372, February.
    5. Andrea Galeotti, 2006. "One-way flow networks: the role of heterogeneity," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(1), pages 163-179, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Haller, Hans, 2012. "Network extension," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 166-172.
    2. Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard & Sudipta Sarangi & J. Kamphorst, 2011. "Confirming information flows in networks," Post-Print halshs-00672351, HAL.
    3. Billand, Pascal & Bravard, Christophe & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2012. "Existence of Nash networks and partner heterogeneity," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 152-158.
    4. Olaizola, Norma & Valenciano, Federico, 2014. "Asymmetric flow networks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 237(2), pages 566-579.
      • Olaizola Ortega, María Norma & Valenciano Llovera, Federico, 2012. "Asymmetric flow networks," IKERLANAK http://www-fae1-eao1-ehu-, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    5. Breitmoser, Yves & Vorjohann, Pauline, 2013. "Efficient structure of noisy communication networks," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 396-409.
    6. Ping Sun & Elena Parilina, 2022. "Impact of Utilities on the Structures of Stable Networks with Ordered Group Partitioning," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 1131-1162, December.
    7. Sudipta Sarangi & Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard, 2006. "Heterogeneity in Nash Networks," Departmental Working Papers 2006-18, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.
    8. Rajgopal Kannan & Lydia Ray & Sudipta Sarangi, 2007. "The structure of information networks," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 30(1), pages 119-134, January.
    9. Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard & Sudipta Sarangi, 2011. "Resources Flows Asymmetries in Strict Nash Networks with Partner Heterogeneity," Working Papers 1108, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    10. Haller, Hans & Hoyer, Britta, 2019. "The common enemy effect under strategic network formation and disruption," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 146-163.
    11. Kinateder, Markus & Merlino, Luca Paolo, 2022. "Local public goods with weighted link formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 316-327.
    12. Hellmann, Tim & Staudigl, Mathias, 2014. "Evolution of social networks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 234(3), pages 583-596.
    13. Dev, Pritha, 2010. "Choosing `Me' and `My Friends': Identity in a Non-Cooperative Network Formation Game with Cost Sharing," MPRA Paper 21631, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Banchongsan Charoensook, 2022. "A Characterization of Nonminimal Nash Networks in Two-way Flow Model," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 23(2), pages 329-340, November.
    15. Alan Griffith, 2022. "A continuous model of strong and weak ties," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(6), pages 1519-1563, December.
    16. Pramila Krishnan & Emanuela Sciubba, 2009. "Links and Architecture in Village Networks," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(537), pages 917-949, April.
    17. Olaizola, By Norma & Valenciano, Federico, 2021. "Efficiency and stability in the connections model with heterogeneous nodes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 189(C), pages 490-503.
    18. Norma Olaizola & Federico Valenciano, 2010. "Information, Stability and Dynamics in Networks under Institutional Constraints," Working Papers 2010.128, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    19. Joost Vandenbossche & Thomas Demuynck, 2013. "Network Formation with Heterogeneous Agents and Absolute Friction," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 42(1), pages 23-45, June.
    20. Zenou, Yves & De Martí, Joan, 2009. "Ethnic Identity and Social Distance in Friendship Formation," CEPR Discussion Papers 7566, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2011-11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/delsuus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.