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A Characterization of Nonminimal Nash Networks in Two-way Flow Model

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  • Banchongsan Charoensook

    (Department of International Business, Keimyung Adams College, Keimyung University)

Abstract

A long-lasting open question in the literature of strategic network formation is the characterization of nonminimal Nash networks in the context of two way flow model with nonrival information. In this note, I provide a partial answer to this question for the class of nonminimal networks such that every chain between two agents has the length of at most two and heterogeneity in information value possessed by each agent is assumed. I show that every strict Nash network is a strongly nested split graph. I also show that every strict Nash network is also efficient given a specific structure of information value.

Suggested Citation

  • Banchongsan Charoensook, 2022. "A Characterization of Nonminimal Nash Networks in Two-way Flow Model," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 23(2), pages 329-340, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:cuf:journl:y:2022:v:23:i:2:charoensook
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Network Formation; Two-way Flow Network; Nested Split Graph; Nash Network; Efficient Network;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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