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Time consistency and bureaucratic budget competition

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  • Konrad, Kai A.
  • Kessing, Sebastian G.

Abstract

High employment protection in the public sector results in strategic over-employment if government divisions compete for budgets in a dynamic setting. Bureaucrats who are interested in maximising their divisions' output employ excess labour, since this induces the sponsor to provide complementary inputs in the future. Restrictions on hiring decisions in the public sector can be regarded as provisions to reduce strategic hiring. We also provide evidence from a survey of decision makers in a public sector bureaucracy with very high employment protection. The results confirm that decision makers are aware of the strategic effects of their hiring decisions on budget allocation. © 2008 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2008.

Suggested Citation

  • Konrad, Kai A. & Kessing, Sebastian G., 2008. "Time consistency and bureaucratic budget competition," Munich Reprints in Economics 22090, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenar:22090
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    Cited by:

    1. Sebastian G. Kessing & Chiara Strozzi, 2017. "The regional distribution of public employment: theory and evidence," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 51(7), pages 1100-1114, July.
    2. Peter K. Hazlett & Chandler S. Reilly, 2023. "Bureaucratic rent creation: the case of price discrimination in the market for postsecondary education," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 226-256, June.
    3. Marcus Drometer, 2012. "Bureaucrats and short-term politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 149-163, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bureaucracy; decision making; employment; public sector; resource allocation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration

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