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Monetary Policy Strategies of the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve Bank of the U.S

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  • L. Randall Wray

Abstract

In the debate on monetary policy strategies on both sides of the Atlantic, it is now almost a commonplace to contrast the Fed and the ECB by pointing out the former's flexibility and capacity to adjust rigidity, and the latter's extreme caution, and obsession with low inflation. In looking at the foundations of the two banks' strategies, however, we do not find differences that can provide a simple explanation for their divergent behavior, nor for the very different economic performance in the U.S. and Euroland in recent years. Not surprisingly, both central banks share the same conviction that money is neutral in the long period, and even their short-term policies are based on similar fundamental principles. The two policy approaches really differ only in terms of implementation, timing, competence, etc., but not in terms of the underlying theoretical orientation. We then draw the conclusion that monetary policy cannot represent a significant variable in the explanation of the different economic performances of Euroland and U.S. The two economic areas' differences must be explained by considering other factors among which the most important is fiscal policy.

Suggested Citation

  • L. Randall Wray, 2005. "Monetary Policy Strategies of the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve Bank of the U.S," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_431, Levy Economics Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:lev:wrkpap:wp_431
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. L. Randall Wray, 2004. "The Case for Rate Hikes: Did the Fed Prematurely Raise Rates?," Economics Public Policy Brief Archive ppb_79, Levy Economics Institute.
    2. Joreg Bibow, 2005. "Refocusing the ECB on Output Stabilization and Growth through Inflation Targeting?," Macroeconomics 0507017, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Dimitri B. Papadimitriou & L. Randall Wray, 1994. "Flying Blind: The Federal Reserve's Experiment with Unobservables," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_124, Levy Economics Institute.
    4. Steven M. Fazzari & R. Glenn Hubbard & Bruce C. Petersen, 1988. "Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 19(1), pages 141-206.
    5. Benjamin M. Friedman, 2004. "Why the Federal Reserve Should Not Adopt Inflation Targeting," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 129-136, March.
    6. Laurence H. Meyer, 2001. "Does money matter?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 83(May), pages 1-16.
    7. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2004. "Why the Federal Reserve Should Adopt Inflation Targeting," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 117-127, March.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Angel Asensio, 2011. "Inflation Targeting Drawbacks in the Absence of a ‘Natural’ Anchor: A Keynesian Appraisal of the Fed and ECB Policies from 1999 to 2006," Chapters, in: Claude Gnos & Louis-Philippe Rochon (ed.), Credit, Money and Macroeconomic Policy, chapter 11, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Angel Asensio, 2007. "Inflation targeting drawbacks in the absence of a 'natural' anchor," Post-Print halshs-00189225, HAL.
    4. Becchetti, Leonardo & Castriota, Stefano & Giuntella, Giovanni Osea, 2010. "The effects of age and job protection on the welfare costs of inflation and unemployment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 137-146, March.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E12 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Keynes; Keynesian; Post-Keynesian; Modern Monetary Theory
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory

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