Evidential equilibria in static games
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More about this item
Keywords
Evidential and causal reasoning; evidential games; social projection functions; ingroups and outgroups; evidential equilibria and consistent evidential equilibria; Nash equilibria; common knowledge and epistemic foundations.;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2012-09-30 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2012-09-30 (History and Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2012-09-30 (Microeconomics)
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