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Intersubjective Consistency Of Knowledge And Belief

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  • Giacomo Bonanno

    (Department of Economics, University of California Davis)

Abstract

We consider interactive epistemic models where individuals are described by both their ""knowledge"" and their ""beliefs."" Three intersubjective consistency conditions are examined: Intersubjective Caution (if an individual believes something to be common belief then he knows it to be common belief), Truth of Common Belief (only true facts are commonly believed) and Qualitative Agreement. These conditions are employed in characterizations of the following properties which describe either the extent of intersubjective truth and/or the logic of common belief: common belief in no error, common knowledge of common belief, negative introspection of common belief, coincidence of common knowledge and common belief, and collapse of individual belief and knowledge. We also discuss to what extent the three fundamental conditions can be viewed as intersubjective rationality conditions.

Suggested Citation

  • Giacomo Bonanno, 2003. "Intersubjective Consistency Of Knowledge And Belief," Working Papers 175, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:175
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    1. Elchanan Ben-Porath, 1997. "Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect-Information Games," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 64(1), pages 23-46.
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    11. Stuart, Harborne Jr., 1997. "Common Belief of Rationality in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 133-143, April.
    12. Bonanno, Giacomo & Nehring, Klaus, 1998. "On the logic and role of Negative Introspection of Common Belief," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 17-36, January.
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