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Théorie des incitations : un exemple introductif

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  • LAFFONT, Jean-Jacques

Abstract

La prise en compte de l'information et en particulier de la décentralisation de l'information dans la formulation de la politique économique ne fait que commencer. Toutefois, les cinq dernières années ont vu se multiplier les études théoriques dans ce domaine. La définition même d'un concept d'optimalité approprié n'est pas encore acquise (voir par exemple MYERSON [1979]). Divers problèmes informationnels ont été formulés, le problème de la révélation des préférences pour les biens publics (voir par exemple GREEN et LAFFONT [1979]), le problème de la relation principal - agent (HOLMSTROM [1979] , SHAVELL [1979]), le problème de la définition d'enchères optimales (MYERSON (1978]), le problème de la transmission d'information statistique (GREEN [1979] ), le problème des bonus dans la planification centralisée (WEITZMAN [1975], THOMSON [1979], le problème de la taxation de caractéristiques non observables (MIRRLEES [1976]), etc.... De toutes ces études se dégage une méthodologie qui est à peu près la suivante : étant donné le problème informationnel particulier considéré qui, pour être bien défini, doit inclure une spécification précise des outils disponibles, taxes, types d'observations, etc..., la première tâche doit être une caractérisation des mécanismes qui permettent de résoudre le problème informationnel. Comme il existe plusieurs concepts de solution selon la force des incitations que l'on souhaite obtenir, il y aura plusieurs théorèmes de caractérisation pour un problème donné. Ainsi on caractérisera les mécanismes pour lesquels le concept d'équilibre utilisé est un équilibre en stratégies dominantes ou seulement un équilibre de Nash. Lorsqu'il n'existera pas de mécanisme pour un concept d'équilibre donné on concluera à un théorème d'impossibilité, comme par exemple le très important théorème d'impossibilité de GIBBARD [1973] ] et SATTERTHWAITE [ 1975 ] . Les théorèmes de caractérisation sont fondamentaux car ils permettent de décrire la famille des solutions
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Suggested Citation

  • LAFFONT, Jean-Jacques, 1980. "Théorie des incitations : un exemple introductif," Institut des Mathématiques Economiques – Document de travail de l’I.M.E. (1974-1993) 40, Institut des Mathématiques Economiques. LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS, Université de Bourgogne.
    • Handle: RePEc:lat:imefth:40
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Groves, Theodore & Ledyard, John O, 1977. "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 783-809, May.
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    information ; équilibre;

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