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Preference for Control vs. Random Dictatorship

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  • Antonio Estache
  • Renaud Foucart
  • Konstantinos Georgalos

Abstract

In a laboratory experiment, we find that subjects do not exhibit preference for control when the alternative is a random dictatorship, a lottery implementing either their choice or the choice of someone else with equal probability. In contrast, we replicate Owens et al. (2014)’s result that they do so when the alternative is to have the choice of someone else implemented with certainty. This implies that the introduction of random dictatorships in discrete procedures such as those used for the allocation of some public procurement contracts does not necessarily involve a loss of perceived autonomy.

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Estache & Renaud Foucart & Konstantinos Georgalos, 2024. "Preference for Control vs. Random Dictatorship," Working Papers 413554011, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    • Handle: RePEc:lan:wpaper:413554011
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Francesco Decarolis & Raymond Fisman & Paolo Pinotti & Silvia Vannutelli, 2019. "Rules, Discretion, and Corruption in Procurement: Evidence from Italian Government Contracting," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-344, Boston University - Department of Economics.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    control; lotteries; random dictatorship;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement

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