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Strategic Gains from Labor Market Discrimination

Author

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  • Johan N. M. Lagerlöf

    (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen)

Abstract

According to a classical argument, an employer handicaps herself if she bases hiring decisions on factors unrelated to productivity; therefore, discrimination is undermined by competition. The present paper, in contrast, argues that being discriminatory can be a commitment device that helps an employer and its rivals to partially segment the labor market, which leads to lower wages and higher profits. Discrimination can thus be an endogenous response to (changes in) competition. Indeed, the relationship between discrimination and competition can be non-monotone. Moreover, a ban on wage discrimination (which may be feasible, as such discrimination is easily detectable) may lead to discrimination in hiring (which cannot be banned because it is harder to observe).

Suggested Citation

  • Johan N. M. Lagerlöf, 2016. "Strategic Gains from Labor Market Discrimination," Discussion Papers 16-03, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1603
    as

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    File URL: http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/dp_2016/1603.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    discrimination; competition; strategic interaction; market segmentation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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