IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/kud/epruwp/05-11.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Present-Biased Individuals, Optimal Paternalism, and Transfers in Kind

Author

Listed:
  • Jes Winther Hansen

    (Department of Economics, University of Denmark)

Abstract

Present-biased preferences cause distortions in consumption that can motivate the use of paternalistic in-kind transfers. Empirically, goods are consumed to different degrees when consumption outlay changes. Economists distinguish between necessary goods and luxury goods. A present-biased individual has an intertemporal distortion of consumption toward the present, which in turn distorts present consumption toward luxury goods. In-kind transfers of necessary goods, such as food stamps, can alleviate the intertemporal distortion and make present-biased transfer recipients better off. Further, transfers in kind are asymmetrical in the sense that they can target present-biased recipients without affecting fully rational recipients.

Suggested Citation

  • Jes Winther Hansen, 2005. "Present-Biased Individuals, Optimal Paternalism, and Transfers in Kind," EPRU Working Paper Series 05-11, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:kud:epruwp:05-11
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://web.econ.ku.dk/epru/files/wp/wp-05-11.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bruce, Neil & Waldman, Michael, 1991. "Transfers in Kind: Why They Can Be Efficient and Nonpaternalistic," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1345-1351, December.
    2. Matthew Rabin & Ted O'Donoghue, 1999. "Doing It Now or Later," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 103-124, March.
    3. Nichols, Albert L & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1982. "Targeting Transfers through Restrictions on Recipients," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 372-377, May.
    4. Robert A. Pollak, 1969. "Conditional Demand Functions and Consumption Theory," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 83(1), pages 60-78.
    5. E. S. Phelps & R. A. Pollak, 1968. "On Second-Best National Saving and Game-Equilibrium Growth," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 35(2), pages 185-199.
    6. Currie, Janet, 2004. "The Take-Up of Social Benefits," IZA Discussion Papers 1103, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Shapiro, Jesse M., 2005. "Is there a daily discount rate? Evidence from the food stamp nutrition cycle," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2-3), pages 303-325, February.
    8. David Laibson, 1997. "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(2), pages 443-478.
    9. Diane Whitmore, 2002. "What Are Food Stamps Worth?," Working Papers 847, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Li, Yuan & Yang, Jinqiang & Zhao, Siqi, 2022. "Present-biased government and sovereign debt dynamics," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    2. Janet Currie & Firouz Gahvari, 2008. "Transfers in Cash and In-Kind: Theory Meets the Data," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(2), pages 333-383, June.
    3. Giovanni Mastrobuoni & Matthew Weinberg, 2009. "Heterogeneity in Intra-monthly Consumption Patterns, Self-Control, and Savings at Retirement," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 163-189, August.
    4. Marieke Bos & Chloé Le Coq & Peter van Santen, 2022. "Scarcity and consumers’ credit choices," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 92(1), pages 105-139, February.
    5. Benhabib, Jess & Bisin, Alberto & Schotter, Andrew, 2010. "Present-bias, quasi-hyperbolic discounting, and fixed costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 205-223, July.
    6. Drago, Francesco, 2006. "Career Consequences of Hyperbolic Time Preferences," IZA Discussion Papers 2113, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Laureti, Carolina & Szafarz, Ariane, 2023. "Banking regulation and costless commitment contracts for time-inconsistent agents," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    8. Stefano DellaVigna, 2009. "Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(2), pages 315-372, June.
    9. Lukas, Moritz & Nöth, Markus, 2022. "Voluntary minimum repayments and borrower heterogeneity: Evidence from revolving consumer credit," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
    10. Marcelo Arbex & Enlinson Mattos, 2017. "Optimal Paternalistic Health and Human Capital Policies," Working Papers 1709, University of Windsor, Department of Economics.
    11. Philip Streich & Jack S. Levy, 2007. "Time Horizons, Discounting, and Intertemporal Choice," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 51(2), pages 199-226, April.
    12. Salanie, Francois & Treich, Nicolas, 2006. "Over-savings and hyperbolic discounting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(6), pages 1557-1570, August.
    13. Moreno-Okuno, Alejandro & Aguilera Navarrete, Natividad, 2014. "Distancia Psicológica [Psychological Distance]," MPRA Paper 60745, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Claudia Cerrone, 2021. "Doing It When Others Do: A Strategic Model Of Procrastination," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(1), pages 315-328, January.
    15. Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2011. "The Porter hypothesis and hyperbolic discounting," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(1), pages 167-176.
    16. Chowdhury, Prabal Roy, 2013. "Land acquisition: Political intervention, fragmentation and voice," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 63-78.
    17. Cheng, Long & McDonald, Stuart & Ye, Guangliang, 2023. "Cartelization under present bias and imperfect public signals," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 77-86.
    18. Ambec, Stefan & Treich, Nicolas, 2007. "Roscas as financial agreements to cope with self-control problems," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 120-137, January.
    19. Novak, Lindsey, 2016. "Buy Locally? Big-Box Stores and Time-Inconsistent Preferences," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts 235830, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    20. Chen, Shumin & Luo, Dan & Yao, Haixiang, 2024. "Optimal investor life cycle decisions with time-inconsistent preferences," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    in-kind transfers; time preference;

    JEL classification:

    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kud:epruwp:05-11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thomas Hoffmann (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/epcbsdk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.