Risk aversion does not justify the introduction of mandatory unemployment insurance in the shirking model
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Christian Holzner & Volker Meier & Martin Werding, 2010.
"Time Limits in a Two-tier Unemployment Benefit Scheme under Involuntary Unemployment,"
CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 56(2), pages 251-277, June.
- Christian Holzner & Volker Meier & Martin Werding, 2006. "Time Limits in a Two-tier Unemployment Benefit Scheme under Involuntary Unemployment," ifo Working Paper Series 29, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
- Holzner, Christian & Meier, Volker & Werding, Martin, 2010. "Time limits in a two-tier unemployment benefit scheme under involuntary unemployment," Munich Reprints in Economics 19408, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Rebollo-Sanz, Yolanda, 2012.
"Unemployment insurance and job turnover in Spain,"
Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 403-426.
- Yolanda Rebollo Sanz, 2010. "Unemployment Insurance and Job Turnover in Spain," Working Papers 10.08, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2011.
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More about this item
Keywords
Efficiency Wages; Shirking; Unemployment Insurance;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- J0 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General
- J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DGE-2005-09-11 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-LAB-2005-09-11 (Labour Economics)
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