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Does the Acquisition of Mines Benefit Resource-Importing Countries?

Author

Listed:
  • Keisaku Higashida

    (School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University)

  • Yasuhiro Takarada

    (Faculty of Policy Studies, Nanzan University)

Abstract

Using a simple two-period model, this paper examines the effects of the acquisition of mines/resources by a final goods producer located in a resource-importing country on resource prices in both the first (the present) and second (the future) periods, profits of firms, and welfare. We find that an increase in the mines owned by a final goods producer can increase the resource price in the first period and/or, interestingly, the second period. The strategic behavior of a resource-extracting firm located in a resource-exporting country produces this result. Whether the resource price increases in either period depends on the demand structure for the final goods and the resource supply condition of the final goods producer which owns the mines in the second period. We also consider three extended situations: joint exploration, entry of speculators, and the case of a non-committed investment.

Suggested Citation

  • Keisaku Higashida & Yasuhiro Takarada, 2012. "Does the Acquisition of Mines Benefit Resource-Importing Countries?," Discussion Paper Series 86, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Mar 2012.
    • Handle: RePEc:kgu:wpaper:86
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Acquisition of mines; resource exploitation; governments' support;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment
    • Q31 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
    • Q34 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts

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