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Monetary Base Controllability after an Exit from Quantitative Easing

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  • Atsushi Tanaka

    (School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University)

Abstract

This study examines the problem that a central bank may face after exiting a monetary quantitative easing policy. It develops a simple dynamic optimization model of a central bank, which finds that if the bank needs to absorb a substantial amount of excess reserves when exiting, the monetary base may become uncontrollable. In this case, the bank has no option but to increase the monetary base by more than the target amount, which leads to an undesirable money supply expansion and, ultimately, to inflation pressures. The model shows the condition when a central bank faces such a challenging situation.

Suggested Citation

  • Atsushi Tanaka, 2018. "Monetary Base Controllability after an Exit from Quantitative Easing," Discussion Paper Series 181, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Jul 2018.
    • Handle: RePEc:kgu:wpaper:181
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    File URL: http://192.218.163.163/RePEc/pdf/kgdp181.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mr. Peter Stella & Mr. Ulrich H Klueh, 2008. "Central Bank Financial Strength and Policy Performance: An Econometric Evaluation," IMF Working Papers 2008/176, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Ricardo Reis, 2013. "The Mystique Surrounding the Central Bank's Balance Sheet, Applied to the European Crisis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(3), pages 135-140, May.
    3. Mr. Alain Ize, 2005. "Capitalizing Central Banks: A Net Worth Approach," IMF Working Papers 2005/015, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Robert E. Hall & Ricardo Reis, 2015. "Maintaining Central-Bank Financial Stability under New-Style Central Banking," Economics Working Papers 15109, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
    5. Ricardo Reis, 2013. "The Mystique Surrounding the Central Bank's Balance Sheet, Applied to the European Crisis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(3), pages 135-140, May.
    6. Gustavo Adler & Pedro Castro & Camilo Tovar, 2016. "Does Central Bank Capital Matter for Monetary Policy?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 183-205, February.
    7. Ricardo Reis, 2015. "Different Types of Central Bank Insolvency and the Central Role of Seignorage," NBER Working Papers 21226, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Mr. Peter Stella, 2008. "Central Bank Financial Strength, Policy Constraints and Inflation," IMF Working Papers 2008/049, International Monetary Fund.
    9. Alain Ize, 2005. "Capitalizing Central Banks: A Net Worth Approach," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 52(2), pages 289-310, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Atsushi Tanaka, 2020. "Central Bank Capital and Credibility: A Literature Survey," Discussion Paper Series 208, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised May 2020.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    central bank; monetary base; quantitative easing; exit strategy; solvency; financial strength;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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