Inter-attribute equity in assignment problems: Leveling the playing field by priority design
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More about this item
Keywords
Priority-based assignmen; Market design; Equity in attributes; The relative position rule;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2022-08-29 (Economic Design)
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